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Counterconstitutionalism

Democratic constitutionalism has often erected a high barrier separating the citizen
from the state. This is paradoxical because the very promise of constitutionalism
is to produce precisely the opposite result: to bind the citizen to the state, and
to create and cultivate a constitutional culture that is anchored in participatory
democracy. The author has a name for this paradoxical state of affairs:
counterconstitutionalism. In this article, the author introduces and illustrates the
concept of counterconstitutionalism with reference to bills of rights in constitutional
states representing civil and common law traditions on four continents.
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sur quatre continents.
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Introduction
Democratic constitutionalism has a high ambition. Its purpose is, first,
to design the structures of the state that will exercise authority within a
defined territory and over a group of identifiable persons and, second, to
define the border separating the citizen from the state. But the promise
of democratic constitutionalism is much grander than its purpose. It is to
create a zone of citizenship within which the individuals who voluntarily
subject themselves to the authority of the state may themselves delimit
the boundaries of the terms of their citizenship in that state, and within
those boundaries may pursue their twin objectives of subsistence and
fulfillment.
Two implications followfrom this view ofdemocratic constitutionalism.
First, the individuals who are subject to the authority of the state
provisionally cede their sovereignty to those who administer the state. They
may assert themselves through broad mobilizations or social movements
in order to reclaim their sovereignty at any given moment. Second, those
individuals may revise or rewrite the terms of their citizenship when they
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so desire. This is the essence of participatory democracy. And this, in my
view, is the very promise of constitutionalism. Participatory democracy is
a necessary consequence of conceiving of constitutionalism as a vehicle
through which individuals may set or reset the trajectory of the state, seek
fulfillment within that state, and give meaning to their shared existence.
In this article, I focus on the consequences of participatory democracy
for constitutional design. I draw my inspiration in part from Allan
Hutchinson, who makes a compelling case that democracy is more than
just about elections.' It is instead a profoundly rich and substantive
concept that folds into itself complementary notions of liberty, equality
and opportunity. It also unabashedly defies conventional understandings
of democracy that rest only on process or procedure. Democracy demands
active, not passive, citizenship and it is the duty of the democrat, argues
Hutchinson, to uncover, design and promote strategies to cultivate a
2
culture of participatory democracy in the service of social progress.
On this point, I agree with Hutchinson. His view of democracy is
consistent with my view of the promise of constitutionalism. I regard a
constitution as both a noun and a verb, as both a thing and an activity.'
On the one hand, a constitutional text is, first, a noun. It is a thing-a
document-that enshrines the promises that a people makes to itself and
its future generations. On the other hand, a constitution is also a verb. 4 It is
an action-a doing, a becoming5 and a rebecoming 6 -by which a people
defines and redefines itself, and gives content to the common venture that
its members have undertaken. That is precisely what it means for a people
to confer upon itself a living constitution, one that is never beyond its
reach and whose terms are not static but instead dynamic and receptive
to change. Over time, this becomes a powerful force for both developing
responsible citizens and defining a collective identity anchored in a
concrete constitutional text. That is the promise of constitutionalism. That
is the significance of participatory democracy.
Yet democratic constitutionalism has, in some instances, erected
significant barriers to participatory democracy. This is paradoxical for
1. Allan Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governancefor a DemocraticSociety
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 61.
2.
Ibid. at 79-80.
3.
I am grateful to Gr6goire Webber for introducing me to this approach to constitutionalism.
4.
See Stephen L. Elkin, "The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic" (2001) 69
Fordham L. Rev. 1933 at 1935.
5.
See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) at
113.
6.
See KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, 1973 S.C. 1461 (Indian Supreme Court) at paras.
1924, 2010.
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at least two reasons. First, the promise of democratic constitutionalism
is to produce precisely the opposite result. Second, and perhaps more
interestingly, the forms of democratic constitutionalism that actually impede
participatory democracy are strangely enough anchored in a substantive
conception of democracy that conceives of democracy as much more than
simply a free' and fair. system of popularly contested elections.
I have a name for this paradoxical state of affairs: counterconstitutionalism. These forms of democratic constitutionalism achieve the
very opposite of the promise of constitutionalism. Counterconstitutional
designs are nonetheless consistent with the purpose of constitutionalism
insofar as they fulfill the minimalist twin objectives of creating the
structures of the state and setting the state-citizen boundary. It is therefore
entirely accurate, though perhaps odd, to state that counterconstitutional
constitutions are nevertheless constitutions.
But counterconstitutional constitutions are not consistent with
the promise of democratic constitutionalism. They undermine that
promise. Rather than breathing life into participatory democracy,
counterconstitutionalism smothers the possibility of creating participatory
democracy because counterconstitutional constitutions do not create a
constitutional culture that is receptive to participatory democracy. They
in fact create a constitutional culture that runs counter to participatory
democracy.
In this article, I will introduce and illustrate two forms of this
paradoxical type of constitutionalism, both of which are recent additions
to the toolkit of constitutional statecraft. The first form of democratic
constitutionalism that works a considerable harm upon the prospect
of participatory democracy is contraconstitutionalism.Its mission is to
serve the interest of a rich conception of democracy-one that extends
beyond a procedural understanding of democracy and instead embraces a
substantive view of democracy. However, this form of constitutionalism
dooms itself to failure by relying on the constitutional text alone to create
a constitutional culture that seeks to cultivate participatory democracy.
Supraconstitutionalismis a second formofdemocratic constitutionalism
that runs counter to participatory democracy. Its defining practice is to
hierarchize rights in such a way as to place certain rights beyond the
reach of a democratically mobilized people, and effectively outside of
the bounds of constitutionalism. Though its purpose is to stand in defense
of fundamental rights deemed untouchable, supraconstitutionalism may
actually divest those fundamental rights of their force in the process of
elevating them above other rights. Both contraconstitutionalism and
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supraconstitutionalism work against the establishment and development
of a constitutional culture that is anchored in participatory democracy.
I will begin, in Part II, by exploring two competing notions of
democracy: democracy as process and democracy as substance. I will
adopt an intermediate position that regards participation as the core
value of democracy. In Part III, I will suggest that democracy is possible
only if the domestic constitutional culture is receptive to it. Part IV will
then advance the argument that democratic constitutionalism becomes
counterconstitutional when it creates a constitutional culture that undermines
the promise of constitutionalism. I will introduce contraconstitutionalism
and supraconstitutionalism as models of democratic constitutionalism that
frustrate the creation of a constitutional culture anchored in participatory
democracy. Finally, I will conclude with a few closing thoughts.7
I. The promise of constitutionalism
The rise of constitutionalism has helped to situate the debate on the
purpose of democracy. Some argue that democracy is best understood
as a set of procedures that permit citizens to engage with one another.
These procedures include voting in elections. In contrast, others argue that
democracy entails more than this procedural dimension and demands the
pursuit of certain societal objectives which paint a normative portrait of
citizenship. On this view, democracy commands efforts to improve the
quality of life of citizens, to distribute wealth equitably among the various
segments of society, and to ensure access to such life-sustaining resources
as health care, food and shelter.
In this section, I will describe these two views, after which I will
embrace neither of them. I will instead adopt an intermediate position best
described as an enhanced version of procedural democracy. This enhanced
version is called participatory democracy, which straddles the boundary
separating both constructions of democracy. I will moreover narrow
my position even further by adopting one of two forms of participatory
democracy-one that enhances citizenship. This will provide the backdrop
against which I will argue, in the remainder of this article, that certain forms
of constitutionalism fail to achieve the promise of constitutionalism.
1. Dimensions of democracy
There are two competing visions of democracy. The first is procedural,
the second is substantive. Frank Michelman has studied both models,
describing the former as oriented toward the lawmaking process-focused
7.
Unless otherwise stated in the text, I use the term constitutionalism to refer to democratic
constitutionalism.
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on questions such as who makes the laws and who interprets them-and
the latter concerned with the actual content of those laws.8 According to
the procedural view, democracy is constituted by the popular political
processes that aggregate and reconcile the self-interestedness ofparticipants
through collective interactions while, in contrast, the substantive view
endeavours not to aggregate interests but rather to transform selfinterestedness into altruism in the service of morally virtuous purposes.9
These alternatives-procedural and substantive-focus respectively on
political practice and institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
ideals that democracy allows us to achieve.'0
Quite apart from this distinction, these two dimensions of democracy
may also be distinguished by their respective sources of legitimacy. The
procedural view of democracy derives its legitimacy from the actual
procedures that allow citizens to mediate among their choices and also
from the values that allow us to assess the adequacy of those procedures,
for instance transparency, equality of access and participation, and
impartiality in considering the options open to participants." In contrast,
the substantive view of democracy believes that those political and
participatory procedures should be deployed to achieve certain societal
aims, for instance redressing inequality and assisting the disadvantaged-in
this sense, substantive democracy pursues not only rule by the people but
also and perhaps more importantlyfor the people..12 Substantive democracy
seeks protections for individual and fundamental rights, and resists
majoritarianism.13 Legitimacy, on this account, is anchored in morality. This
leads to the piercing criticism that the procedural conception of democracy
has suffered at the hands of advocates of substantive democracy, who argue
that choosing the procedural over the substantive substitutes a legal, for a
political, conception of rights. 4 This is the core of the distinction between
procedural and substantive notions of democracy.

8.
Frank I. Michelman, "Brennan and Democracy" (1998) 86 Cal. L. Rev. 399 at 401-02, 411.
9.
Irwin P. Stotzky, "Creating the Conditions for Democracy" in Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C.
Slye, eds., DeliberativeDemocracy and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) at
157-59.
10. Anthony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 2d ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2001) at 74.
I1. Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy" in Thomas Christiano,
ed., Philosophyand Democracy: An Anthology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 17 at 18.
12. Thomas W. Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice: Law Politics, and Philosophy (Lanham,
MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995) at 177.
13. James Allan, "Thin Beats Fat Yet Again-Conceptions of Democracy" (2006) 25 Law & Phil.
533 at 535.
14. See e.g. Carol Harlow, "Voice of Difference in a Plural Community" (2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L.
339 at 364.
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Yet rather than adhering to the conventional dichotomy setting in
opposition procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy, there is
another way to frame the choice. First, it is important to recognize that
whether one adopts either a procedural or substantive vision of democracy,
democratic theorists agree that democracy serves four important values:
(1) impartiality; (2) accountability; (3) transparency; and (4) deliberation.' 5
It is equally important to note that one can conceive of more than one
form of procedural democracy, the first being a minimalist and the second
an enhanced conception of procedural democracy. As Barber suggests,
enhanced democracy refers to intense civic engagement in the service of
shared public objectives whereas minimalist democracy characterizes low
levels of participation compounded by, and manifested in, the pursuit of
individualistic and private purposes.16 The enhanced version of procedural
democracy is appealing because it sits between the minimalist proceduralist
view of democracy and the substantive conceptions of democracy,
arrogating part of the mission of each to itself.
In these pages, I adopt an enhanced conception ofprocedural democracy.
I argue that this conception of procedural democracy corresponds to
participatory democracy, which in my view reflects the very promise of
constitutionalism. This construction of constitutionalism is not agnostic on
the role of the state in civil society, nor is it indifferent as to the role of the
citizen within the state and in relation to her fellow citizens. It presents a
normative view of constitutionalism, one whose logic leads to the peculiar
conclusion that some constitutions actually undermine the promise of the
practice of constitutionalism. But this result is no more peculiar than what
follows when constitutions are adopted in states that are unreceptive to a
culture of constitutionalism. 7
A compelling theory of enhanced procedural democracy must provide
for at least four elements, according to Dahl. 8 First, citizens must be
able to exercise effective participation, which entails adequate and equal
opportunities for participating in the discourse. Second, it should adhere to
the principle of voting equality, under which any procedures for decisionmaking are subject to the condition that each citizen has an equal vote.
15. Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007) at 4-7.
16. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: ParticipatoryPoliticsfor a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) at 4.
17. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, "Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
Political Paradox" in Douglas Greenberg et al., eds., ConstitutionalismandDemocracy: Transitionsin
the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
18. Robert A. Dahl, Toward Democracy: A Journey (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies
Press, University of California, 1997) at 61-68.
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Third, those citizens must have the opportunity to understand the matters
upon which they are called to deliberate so that they can express their
preferences accurately and in an informed fashion. Finally, citizens must
have the authority to determine which decisions they will make themselves
collectively according to this procedural notion of democracy and which
are to be delegated to other institutions or parties, who may in turn adopt a
different notion of democracy, perhaps even a substantive one.
Henry Teune has seized upon the concept of democratic development
to illuminate the relationship between the procedural and substantive
dimensions of democracy. Teune has identified four stages of democratic
development, each of which depends on the preceding one, meaning that
the second stage is possible only where a given society has fully achieved
the first, and the third follows from the second, and finally the fourth
arises only if that society has satisfied the third stage. 19 The first stage
is inclusionary democracy, which contemplates political equality among
individuals. The second stage is participatory democracy. This form of
democratic development imagines a society where its members do more
than merely vote and join civic organizations but furthermore express
themselves through other formal means, including political interests groups
and movements and local community-based associations. Next comes
distributive democracy, where public welfare systems develop to confer
the means for human and social development upon their constituents. The
final step in democratic development is substantive democracy, which
represents a virtuous polity in pursuit of a transparent, open and just society
that empowers its members to achieve fulfillment and well-being.
This is a powerfully persuasive lens through which to view the
maturation of a society.Although the objective ofcivil society is to reach the
fourth step-substantive democracy- a society must first labour through
the intervening three steps, each of which is critical to establishing the
requisite stability and creating the public culture that will sustain efforts to
make real the promise of democracy. Some nation-states have ambitiously
endeavoured to achieve several of these cumulative stages all at once,
believing that these steps are better travelled concurrrently. For instance,
Nicaragua has sought to create a participatory democracy by simultaneously
democratizing the political process and guaranteeing social, economic,
and cultural rights that were thought to establish a floor from which to

19.
31.

Henry Teune, "Global Democracy" (2002) 581 Annals Am. Academy Pol. Soc. Sci. 22 at 29-
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engage in popular democracy.20 Yet to this day, Nicaragua remains mired
in instability.2' This indicates that Teune may be correct to suggest that a
state must pursue each stage independently of the other and only once it
successfully achieves the previous stage of democratic development. This
means that in order for a given society to achieve substantive democracy,
it must first pass through participatory democracy.
2. The core value ofparticipation
Participatory democracy stresses civic involvement-beyond the mere
act of voting or polling citizens for their views-in managing the affairs
of the state. 22 Participatory democracy does not give rise to a justiciable
right but is instead a practice that the state must seek to standardize across
the population.23 It conceives of democracy as a continuing process of
self-government and self-definition 24 and holds, as a theory, that popular
participation in the political process serves as a fundamental protection
for self-government. It presupposes that individuals should be directly
involved in decision-making, 26 and strives to convince citizens of the
importance of their role in deciding issues which pertain directly to
27
themselves and their surroundings.
Participation is a core value of democratic constitutionalism that
reflects the Mieklejohnian model of the New England town meeting.28
It seeks to spur a continuing national conversation that Stephen Breyer
sees as integral to citizenship. 29 Popular discourse is the focal element of
participatory democracy, just as Habermas recognized when he observed
that the welfare state could not alone, without the didactic processes of

20. Jules Lobel, "The Meaning of Democracy: Representative and Participatory Democracy in the
New Nicaraguan Constitution" (1988) 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 823 at 858.
21. See Michael Roche, "Competing Claims: The Struggle for Title in Nicaragua" (2006) 39 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 577.
22. Beth Simone Noveck, "The Future of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State" (2004) 1
I.S.J.L.P. I at 4, n. 8.
23. Stijn Smismans, "Narrowing the Gap? Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European
Union: New Governance-The Solution for Active European Citizenship, or the End of Citizenship?"
(2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 595 at 607.
24. "The Rule of Law in Residential Associations," Note, (1985) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 472 at 481.
25. Edward L. Rubin, "Getting Past Democracy" (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711 at 731.
26. Christiana Ochoa, "Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying and
Defining Cil Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain" (2005) 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 105 at 140.
27. Lani Guinier, "More Democracy" [1995] U. Chicago Legal F. I at 5-6.
28. Alexander Meiklejohn, PoliticalFreedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) at 161;
see also Stanley Ingber, "The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth" [1984] Duke L.J. I at 36,
n. 178.
29. Stephen Breyer, "Our Democratic Constitution" (2002) 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 245 at 248-49.
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public communication, bring to life the full measure of citizenship. 0
The educative effect of participation in turn cultivates within citizens an
enhanced ability and interest to participate in future decision-making on
matters of importance to the state. This transforms the task of governing
from a top-down enterprise into a multidirectional relationship between
citizen and state.3 Governance consequently becomes the task of managing
conversations in which people both speak and listen, and ultimately
collaborate in charting a trajectory for their shared future. Absent a culture of
participatory democracy-without this foundational right of participation,
the right of rights, as Waldron describes it so effectively 32-citizenship
loses the fullness of its meaning.
Participatory democracy privileges citizen involvement in shaping
the institutions of civil society.3 But participation must not be geared
solely toward national institutions. Participatory democracy exists only
if individuals press upon disparate points of access and engagement,
from community-based local sites of activity to the highest echelons of
government administration. 34 As Schragger writes, one goal ofparticipatory
democracy is to bring together individuals who would not otherwise come
together to form a political community.35 This is the key to understanding
participatory democracy.
But there is a further wrinkle to participatory democracy. It comes in
at least two forms. 36 The first conceives of participatory democracy as a
method by which to satisfy the fullness of human potential. The second
views participatory democracy as an approach that facilitates progress
toward citizenship. I adopt the latter of these two theories. Participatory
democracy serves the primordial aim of establishing and nourishing the
connection that binds an individual to the state and to other individuals,
transforming that individual from a detached member of society to an
integrated citizen of the state. David Held has articulated the connection
between citizenship and participation, arguing that citizenship can only
be understood as "a reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, the
30. Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, William Rehg trans., (Cambridge, MA.: MIT
.Press, 1996) at 442.
31. John Gastil et al., "There's More than One Way to Legislate: An Integration of Representative,
Direct, and Deliberative Approaches to Democratic Governance" (2001) 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1005 at
1012.
32. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 232.
33. David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987).
34. Christina M. Rodriguez, "Language and Participation" (2006) 94 Cal. L. Rev. 687 at 720-21.
35. Richard C. Schragger, "The Limits of Localism" (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371 at 444.
36. Donald W. Keim, "Participation in Contemporary Democratic Theories" in J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman, eds., Participationin Politics:Nomos XVI (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975)
at 15-18.
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community. Citizenship has entitled membership, membership of the
community in which one lives one's life. And membership has invariably
involved degrees of participation in the community."37
On this view, participatory democracy has an important psychological
component38 insofar as it creates within the citizen a belonging,
connectedness and responsibility to the state. Participatory democracy
nurtures this bond39 by crystallizing the psychological connection between
4
the citizen and her state, the very relation to which Kelsen has alluded, 0
solidifying the collective moral bond that Unger deemed so vital to the
foundation of a legal system, 41 and reinforcing social solidarity, which, for
42
Durkheim, ensured the cohesion of society.
This returns us to the very origins of the term participatorydemocracy.
It was coined in 1960 by philosopher Arnold Kaufman, who was concemed
not with creating good social policy but instead with creating a good
society in which individuals congregated in formal and informal political
institutions in order to engage one another and to pursue the development
of their intellect, spirit, and community. 43 Once instilled in a people,
participatory democracy counteracts alienation and apathy, and cultivates
belonging and involvement. 44 It strengthens the relationship between and
among citizens because it frustrates both the rise of alienation and the
onset of social detachment that is common to modem communities, 4 and
it is moreover oriented toward the communitarian goals of integration and
fulfillment through interaction.' As Rossi writes, participatory democracy

37. David Held, "Between Stale and Civil Society: Citizenship" in Geoff Andrews, ed., Citizenship
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991) at 20.
38. Carole Pateman, Participationand Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970) at 42-43.
39. Ibid.
40. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, M. Knight trans., (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967) at 288.
41. Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The
Free Press, 1976).
42. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, W.D. Halls trans. (New York: MacMillan
Co., 1984) at 24-27.
43. David Alan Sklansky, "Police and Democracy" (2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699 at 1756-57; see
also Jonathan Turley, "The Military Pocket Republic" (2002) 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 at 117 (referring to
the "essential connection between participatory democracy and the human spirit").
44. Marion Crain, "Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for
Worker Empowerment" (1990) 74 Minn. L. Rev. 953 at 969.
45. Richard Briffault, "Our Localism: Part 1-Localism and Legal Theory" (1990) 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 346 at 394-95.
46. Clayton P. Gillette, "Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law"
(1988) 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930 at 935.
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inculcates empathy, virtue and identity in participants. 47 This accounts for
at least part of the causal link between participation and the psychological
bond that ties the individual to the state as well as to her fellow
48
citizens.
This is not a mandarin vision of democracy, 49 one that is dominated
by intellectual, cultural, social or other elites to the exclusion of common
citizens. Quite the contrary, it is a vision of democracy that is squarely
attuned to the common class. It privileges broad popular mobilizations
over elite-driven processes of social reform, regarding the former as
infused with an unassailable legitimacy and the latter as guided by narrow
political interests.
Let me pause to make an important distinction before proceeding
any further. I am an advocate of participatorydemocracy, not populist
democracy. Populist democracy insists that public policy reflect public
opinion. 0 I do not take this majoritarian position." I favour participatory
democracy, which is instead a mode of governance in which citizens
delegate their powers of decision-making to their governmental agents,
retain the right to participate in a meaningful way in public discourse, but
do not possess the authority to dictate outcomes.5 2 In this respect, I resist
the Athenian model, which was a direct democracy, not a participatory
democracy, a distinction that seems to have been lost on many scholars. 3
I regard participatory democracy as a complementary supplement
to-and not a substitute for-liberal democracy. 4 Participatory democracy
does not reject the value of countermajoritarian institutions whose role
47. Jim Rossi, "Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking" (1997) 92 Nw. U.L. Rev. 173 at 210.
48. Lisa M. Card, "One Person, No Vote? A Participatory Analysis of Voting Rights in Special
Purpose Districts" (2004) 27 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 57 at 74.
49. See Ken I. Kersch, "Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty" (2006) 73 U. Chicago L. Rev. 759
(critiquing Stephen Breyer's theory of active liberty).
50. Mark A. Graber, "Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Populism, Law, Political
Science, and Constitutional Change" (2001) 90 Geo. L.J. 233 at 240.
51. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, "Foreword: The Question of Process" (2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1387 at
1388.
52. James M. Donovan, "Civilian Community and the Rebuttable Presumption of Innocence" (2004)
5 J.L. Soc'y 409 at 435.
53. See e.g. Vincent J. Samar, "Justifying the Use of International Human Rights Principles in
American Constitutional Law" (2005) 37 Colum. H.R.L.Rev. I at 55-56; Adriaan Lanni, "'Verdict
Most Just': The Modes of Classical Athenian Justice"-(2004) 16 Yale J.L. & Human. 277 at 284; Adi
Parush, "The Courtroom as Theatre and the Theatre as Courtroom in Ancient Athens" (2001) 35 Isr.
L.Rev. 118 at 125; Nhan T. Vu, "The Nondemocratic Benefits of Elections-The Case of Cambodia"
(1996) 28 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 395 at 455 n. 293; Thomas W. Simon, "Suspect Class Democracy:
A Social Theory" (1990) 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 107 at 116; David A. J. Richards, "Constitutional
Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy" (1986) 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 800 at 818.
54. Reza Dibadj, "Postmodernism, Representation, Law" (2007) 29 Haw. L. Rev. 377 at 432.
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is to vindicate core civil and political rights." Indeed, judicial review is
a legitimate function in a participatory democracy precisely because it
stands in defense of the interest of the public, not necessarily the interest
of elites who, through representative democracy, control the shape and
content of the institutions of the state. 6 My conception of participatory
democracy consequently rejects the minimalist procedural dimension of
democracy and looks favourably upon some elements of the substantive
vision of democracy. But it remains firmly committed to the proposition
that the state derives its legitimacy from citizens and their participation in
charting, but not controlling, the trajectory of the state.
3. Creatingparticipatorydemocracy
Perhaps the most critical precondition to successfully erecting a structure
within which participatory democracy can take hold and flourish is to create
the conditions for informed citizenship. 7 Another important requirement
for participatory democracy is that its participants participate honestly,
authentically, according to principle and in good faith.58
But let us not overstate the virtue of participatory democracy. After
all, prominent constitutional architects like James Madison resisted
participatory democracy59 in favour of representative democracy.60
Madison feared that direct participatory democracy would render
government subject to the fickleness of the masses, a non-trivial concern
to which the psychology of group behaviour may lend some credence. 6
The Madisonian vision of course won the day in the United States.
Nonetheless, there remain strong currents of participatory democracy

55. David Mullan, "The Role for Underlying Constitutional Principles in a Bill of Rights World"
[2004] 2004 N.Z.L. Rev. 9 at 36.
56. Reuel E. Schiller, "From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism,
and the Waning of Union Strength" (1999) 20 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 at 56. But elites have an
equally strong motivation to support the creation of blame-shifting mechanisms like judicial review.
See Stephen Holmes, "Lineages of the Rule of Law" in Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski,
eds., Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
57. Reza Dibadj, "Weasel Numbers" (2006) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1325 at 1381; James M. Donovan,
"Same-Sex Union Announcements: Precis on a Not so Picayune Matter" (2003) 49 Loy. L. Rev. 171
at 207; John Powell, "Campaign Finance Reform is a Voting Rights Issue: The Campaign Finance
System as the Latest Incarnation of the Politics of Exclusion" (2002) 5 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y Rep. I at
37.
58. W. Bradley Wendel, "Civil Obedience" (2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 363 at 409.
59. James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, "Madisonian Equal Protection" (2004) 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 837 at 901-02.
60. Ellen E. Sward, "Justification and Doctrinal Evolution" (2004) 37 Conn. L. Rev. 389 at 468.
61. David A. J. Richards, "A Theory of Free Speech" (1987) 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1837 at 1845-46.
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in the American constitutional tradition. 62 For instance, Madisonianism
looks very favourably upon representative democracy precisely because
it reflects popular will as an expression of the public-regarding common
interest and not the aggregation of private interests.63 And Dewey, a
pragmatist, advanced a coml elling vision of democracy that invited public
participation in political life. 64
Whether one casts participatory democracy in either descriptive
or normative terms, it turns out that participatory democracy confronts
barriers on both counts: first, most individuals tend to be non-participants
in political and deliberative processes; and second, to compel participation,
rather than simply to invite it, would perhaps undermine the very basis of
65
participatory democracy.
Nonetheless, I reject the claim that increased public participation in
66
public discourse will lead to a decline in the quality of that discourse.
Quite the contrary, I believe that participation is enriching because it inserts
multiple viewpoints into the political discourse given that individuals
necessarily possess different convictions in light of their differing life
experiences. 67 On this view, participatory democracy draws its legitimacy
from its integrative quality and its capacity to help empower the powerless,
68
all while serving the interest of liberty and equality.
II. Constitutionalculture
Having argued that participatory democracy is the promise of
constitutionalism, we must now establish how to create a participatory
democracy. In this Part, I endeavour to do just that. I argue that in order to
create a participatory democracy, the state must first create a constitutional
culture that is receptive to the values of participatory democracy. I begin
by exploring the meaning of constitutional culture. Then, I probe the
relationship between constitutional culture and constitutional design. This
62. Stephen G. Breyer, "Reflections of a Junior Justice" (2005) 54 Drake L. Rev. 7 at 12-13; Frank
I. Michelman, "The Supreme Court, 1985 Terma-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government" (1986) 100
Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 57; Kathryn Abrams, "On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment" (1984) 93 Yale
L.J. 723 at 731; Alexander M. Bickel, "The New Supreme Court: Prospects and Problems" (1971) 45
Tul. L. Rev. 229 at 242.
63. John Lawrence Hill, "A Third Theory of Liberty: The Evolution of our Conception of Freedom
in American Constitutional Thought" (2002) 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 115 at 140-42.
64. Ascanio Piomelli, "The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering" (2006) 12 Clinical L.
Rev. 541 at 565.
65. Edward Rubin, "The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse" (2005) 103
Mich. L. Rev. 2073 at 2103-05.
66. See e.g. Karen McCullagh, "E-Democracy: Potential for Political Revolution?" (2003) 11 Int'l
J.L. & I.T. 149.
67. Susan D. Carle, "Theorizing Agency" (2005) 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 at 363.
68. Richard C. Boldt, "Public Education as Public Space" (2002) 61 Md. L. Rev. 13 at 49-50.
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Part will set the stage for our subsequent discussion of constitutional designs
that run counter to a constitutional culture of participatory democracy.
1. Understandingconstitutionalculture
The constitutional culture of a people in a particular state derives from more
than the laws recorded on the books. 69 It is, on one persuasive view, "a web
of interpretative norms, canons, and practices which most members of a
particular community accept and employ."70 On another, it is a "network
of understandings and practices that structure our constitutional tradition,
including those that shape law but would not be recognized as 'lawmaking'
according to the legal system's own formative criteria."' 71 It has also been
defined as "a specific subset of culture that encompasses extrajudicial
beliefs about the substance of the Constitution. '72 Constitutional culture
involves "the accepted belief that the governing charter is created by the
citizenry; the knowledge that the charter is not timeless, but rather that
the citizens may change it or revoke it under certain circumstances....73
Constitutional culture may also transcend nations and become ingrained
across borders.

74

These are not incompatible constructions of constitutional culture.
Each highlights the role of the private citizen in legitimating the law and
integrating legal norms into the social consciousness. Constitutional culture
is, in Sanford Levinson's helpful formulation, a civic religion anchored in
reason not faith.75 It develops through community-wide popular discourse,
collective and individual action, and political expression.76 To exist, a
constitutional culture requires at least three conditions: (1) overlapping
claims of authority; (2) a complex system of popular convictions; and

69. Jim Hawkins, "Papers, Petitions, and Parades: Free Expression's Pivotal Function in the Early
Labor Movement" (2007) 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 63 at 103.
70. John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakore & Jonathan Riley, "Editors Introduction" in John Ferejohn, Jack
N. Rakore & Jonathan Riley, eds., Constitutional Culture and DemocraticRule (Cambridge, MA.:
Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 10.
71. Reva Siegel, "Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective"
(2001) 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297 at 303.
72. Robert C. Post, "The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law" (2003) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 8.
73. Jason Mazzone, "The Creation of a Constitutional Culture" (2005) 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 671 at 672.
74. See Edward J. Eberle, "Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience" (2005) 10 Roger Williams U.
L. Rev. 289 at 302-03.
75. Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalFaith(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) at 52;
see also Frank H. Wu, "The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform" (1996)
7 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 35 at 53 ("In this way constitutional theory informs and contributes to political
action; a civic culture is created which is also a constitutional culture.").
76. Doni Gewirtzman, "Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of
Constitutional Culture" (2005) 93 Geo. L.J. 897 at 899.
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(3) a vernacularized language by which to express and cultivate those
convictions. 7"
Constitutional culture is erected on a shifting foundation, and draws
its strength from the many repositories of public and popular power that
constitute its base.7 8 Granted, the judiciary, in deciding cases, sets forth
rules that govern public and private interactions, and that more broadly
articulate the values that shape the citizenry and the state.79 But crafting
a constitutional culture is a shared collaborative enterprise between
legal and nonlegal actors,80 politicians and citizens. 81 And this, in turn,
underscores the importance of constitutional culture. It infuses the spirit
of a particular people and, once in place, the common constitutional
culture provides the backdrop against which political disagreements can
be debated and resolved on peaceful terms rather than escalating into
82
disruptive constitutional clashes or violent revolution.
The product of this formula for creating and sustaining a constitutional
culture resembles Durkheim's conception of a social fact. A Durkheimian
social fact exerts an external constraint over an individual yet that
individual feels it only slightly, if at all, because she ultimately ceases
to feel its influence and instead develops habits and inner tendencies
consistent with this intrinsic characteristic of social life. 3 This is very
similar to Hart's Practice Theory of Social Rules positing that communities
adopt certain standards for the behaviour of their members-standards
that ripen into obligations based on social norms that emerge from the
regularity of human conduct.8 4 These social facts, and the social norms
in which they are anchored, take root and subsequently evolve through
the interactions of citizens among themselves, and those between citizens
and their government agents. It is these very interactions that give rise
to constitutional culture, which in turn shapes popular discourse on the

77. Robert L. Tsai, "Democracy's Handmaid" (2006) 86 B.U.L. Rev. I at 52.
78. Abner S. Greene, "Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power" (2000). 75 Chicago-Kent.
L. Rev. 477 at 479.
79. Ashutosh Bhagwat, "Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine" (1998) 30
Conn. L. Rev. 961 at 1002-03.
80. Paul Horwitz, "Grutter's First Amendment" (2005) 46 B.C.L. Rev. 461 at 574, 589.
81. Keith E. Wittington, "Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and The Revival of Grand Constitutional
Theory" (2000) 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 509 at 529.
82. Kpith E. Whittington, "Yet Another Constitutional Crisis" (2002) 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2093
at 2145.
83. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of SociologicalMethod, W.D. Halls trans. (New York: Free Press,
1982) at 50-59.
84. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 254-57.
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constitutional text and invites what Siegel calls deliberative engagement
among citizens and public officials.85
But constitutional culture does not necessarily grow from .or require a
constitutional text.86 In the American constitutional tradition, constitutional
87
culture encompasses several non-constitutional documents and speeches.
It may also include judicial precedent, for instance transformative cases
like Roe v. Wade88 or Brown v. Board of Education.89 Likewise, in the
nascent eastern European constitutional traditions, it is understood that
constitutional culture includes unwritten economic rights, which in those
states are regarded as prerequisites for the exercise of other fundamental
rights such as voting and speech.9" In some ways, a static and rigid
constitutional text may inhibit the development of constitutional culture
because constitutional culture is changeable and variable over time, and is
therefore dynamic, contested and contestable.9 1
Nonetheless, a constitutional text, one that is accessible and
intelligible to the lay, is a powerful tool for triggering the entrenchment
of a constitutional culture. Words are infinitely important to the creation
of constitutional culture for, at bottom, creating a constitutional culture
92
involves constitutional myth-making.
From the text flow both specific and general principles of public
citizenship as well as broader notions of the proper administration of
the state. The text may constitutionalize deeply held cultural convictions
(as in the case of the American Establishment 93 or Takings 94 Clauses, or
German property rights protections, 95 or Canadian minority language
85. Reva B. Siegel, "Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and the Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA" (2006) 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 at 1325.
86. Larry Kramer, "Generating Constitutional Meaning" (2006) 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1439 at 1443.
87. Robin West, "Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine" (2006) 81 ChicagoKent. L. Rev. 1127 at 1157-58.
88. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe
World" (2007) 51 St. Louis L.J. 611 at 651.
89. John C. Jeffries, Jr., "The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law" (1999) 109 Yale L.J. 87 at
101.
90. Richard E. Levy, "Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic
Rights" (1995) 73 N.C.L. Rev. 329 at 416-17.
91. David Schneiderman, "Banging Constitutional Bibles: Observing Constitutional Culture in
Transition" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 833 at 837-38.
92. See Robert L. Tsai, "Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making" (2004) 93 Geo. L.J. 181
at 184.
93. See Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, ed., "Roundtable Discussion on International Human Rights
Standards in the United States: The Case of Religion or Belief' (1998) 12 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 973 at
983-84.
94. See Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 at 1028 (1992).
95. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, "The Unification of Germany: What Would Jhering Say?" (1994)
17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 277.
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rights96 ). The text may expressly set the constitution as the basis for
instilling constitutional culture (consider the Eritrean model97). The text
may also help create the conditions for shaping cultural sensibilities (for
example the American Fourteenth Amendment"). Consider, for instance,
that Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which obliges federal and state
officials and institutions to abide by the constitutional constructions of
the United States Supreme Court, is itself one-but only one, albeit an
important one-source of the American constitutional culture of the rule
of law.99 Indeed, cultivating the rule of law through the constitutional text
was the very intent of the American founding generation. 10
It is hard enough to understand what is meant by the term constitutional
culture but it is perhaps even harder to understand how it emerges and
relates to constitutionalism. We know at a minimum that the culture of a
legal rule or norm exerts a significant influence on the adoption of new
rules or norms, or the establishment of new government powers. 10 We
also know, as a matter of historical fact, that although social changes in
post-war Italy exerted a significant strain on its then-new constitutional
structure, those structures were not only resilient in the face of those
pressures but more importantly helped to manage them.'0 2
These are important historical insights. But constitutional theory may
be equally helpful in illuminating our inquiry into the relationship between
structure and culture. A particularly useful point of reference is the work of
Ludwikowski on emerging European democracies, in which he observes

96. See Matthew B. Hanna, "Trudeau's Legacy: Legal Bilingualism in Canada" (2002) 20 B.U. Int'l
L.J. 189.
97. Constitution of Eritrea, art. 2, § 5: "This Constitution shall serve as a basis for instilling
constitutional culture and for enlightening citizens to respect fundamental human rights and duties."

98.

See Mark D. Rosen, "Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers"

(2007) 95 Cal. L. Rev. 451 at 456; Reva B. Siegel, "She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family" (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 at 983.
99. Stephen L. Carter, "The Morgan 'Power' and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional
Decisions" (1986) 53 U. Chicago L. Rev. 819 at 831; see also Paul-W. Kahn, "Interpretation and
Authority in State Constitutionalism" (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147 (arguing that there exists only one
national constitutional culture and not several state constitutional cultures). But see Peter R. Teachout,
"Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in

State Constitutional Law" (1988) 13 Vt. L. Rev. 13.at 19 (contending that states have their own unique
constitutional cultures). It is also true that the rule of law can exist only where the people are willing

to abide by it and bind themselves to its strictures. See Tom Lynch, "Constitutional Revolution in the
Ex-Communist World" (1999) 6 Hum. Rts. Br. 24 at 24.
100. Jack Wade Nowlin, "The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional Reform in the
Spirit of the Bill of Rights" (2002) 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 171 at 180.
101. Xavier Boissy, Lasparationdespouvoirs oeuvre jurisprudentielle : sur la construction de I'ttat
de droit postcommuniste (Bruxelles : Emile Bruyland, 2003) at 95.
102. Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, "An Italian Federalism? The State, its Institutions and
National Culture as Rule of Law Guarantor" (2006) 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 799 at 824-25.
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that although these new states may possess constitutional structures
and public institutions that are similar to or the same as their American
counterparts, they have not yet embraced the rule of law.103
The rule of law is of course an elemental and elementary principle that
has entered the collective consciousness of western liberal democracies
in much the same way as would a Durkheimian social fact. The rule
of law exists because, well, it exists, and it is virtually impossible to
conceive of liberal democratic social life without the rule of law.
Ludwikowski's analysis is fascinating for many reasons, but particularly
because he seems to suggest that constitutional culture requires not only
constitutional structures that are designed to integrate democratic concepts
within the four corners of the meaning of citizenship-for instance the
separation of powers, human rights protections, and civilian control of
the military" 3'n-but also requires that citizens first assume a posture that
is receptive to, and in turn makes themselves susceptible to developing
a resolute belief in, these values. Ludwikowski sees this connection as
sequential, with culture driving structure.
2. Constitutionalismand constitutionalculture
One illustration of the interconnection of structure and culture, according
to the parliamentary theorist Dicey, is American federalism. He argues
that a "spirit of legality" exists in the American people such that this
reverence for the law has facilitated the creation, survival and flourishing
of the federal system, with its attendant checks, balances and juricentric
model of law. 05 On this view, culture is a precondition for structure.
Specifically, Dicey suggests that federalism can exist in the United States
only because the popular sentiment was ripe for it once upon a time and
remains so today. It is important to realize that Dicey's view is peculiar
to the United States. He does not believe, on my reading, that federalism
could necessarily flourish in other nations as it has in the United States. It
is not a constitutional structure that can be transplanted from one context
to another. Instead, according to Dicey, American political culture is
uniquely receptive to federalism.
There are other compelling historical arguments suggesting that
structure controls culture. As Osiatynski observes with respect to eastern
European nations emerging from non-democratic systems, "constitutional

103. Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European Democracies"
(2000) 29 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. I at 2-3.
104. Ibid. at 27-29.
105. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1982) at 170-75.
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culture is best built by the application of a constitution in daily life,"
adding that states should not "delay the adoption of a new constitution
until social consciousness changes.' ' 0 6 This is relevant to our inquiry
because Osiatynski has sought to answer similar questions, including
whether the adoption of a constitution should await the creation of a
constitutional culture, or whether constitutional culture should first lay
the foundation for ushering in a constitutional text." 7 Other examples of
structure directing culture include the recent South African Constitution,
which created certain institutional structures with an eye toward shaping
a culture of human rights in the nation and its people, 08 and post-war
Germany's new constitutional structures designed to mitigate the cultural
peculiarities that gave rise to social and political extremism. 9
A fascinating counter-example-in which political culture has refused
to conform to constitutional structure-comes from Canada. The recent
Canadian ConstitutionAct was enacted in 1982. It is significant for several
reasons, but perhaps mostly for three new institutional mechanisms that
it introduced to the Canadian polity. First and foremost, it included the
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, it ushered in a
constitutionalized power of judicial review of those entrenched rights. 10
Finally, the Charter also features a clause-called the notwithstanding
clause-authorizing legislatures to suspend the application of a judicial
decision forup to five years.' This clause is Canada's answer to reconciling
the enduring tension between constitutionalism and democracy.
The notwithstanding clause was conceived as a constitutional device
12
to ensure legislators the last word in shaping matters of public policy.
At the time, the bordering United States had witnessed an increasing
frequency of judicial review, perhaps best encapsulated, at least in the
minds of its critics, in Roe v. Wade." 3 Canadian constitutional drafters

106. Wiktor Osiatynski, "Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing" (2003) 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 244 at
267.
107. Ibid.
108. Yvonne Mokgoro, "The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution" (1997) 41
St. Louis L.J. 1279 at 1288.
109. Russell A. Miller, "Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of "Pure Politics" in the United
States and Germany" (2004) 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 587 at 646-47.
110. Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a), Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1987, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 52 [CanadianCharter].
I11. Ibid.,s. 33.
112. Library of Parliament: Parliamentary Information and Research Services, The Notwithstanding
Clause of the Charterby. David Johansen and Philip Rosen (Ottawa: Library of Parliament 1989
revised 2005) online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/infornation/library/PRBpubs/
bp 194-e.htm>.
113. 401 U.S. 113 (1973).
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were therefore motivated in part by the concern that the new power of
judicial review would embolden the judiciary."4 But something quite
extraordinary has happened in the intervening years. The clause has been
invoked with diminishing frequency-only seventeen times, and not once
by the federal Parliament' "-and is now politically radioactive, virtually
relegated to desuetude." 6 There are several reasons for this trend but the
most important may be that the judiciary is more trusted as an institution
than the legislature," 7 and is more likely, according to a majority of
Canadians, to reach the right answer in interpreting the Charterof Rights
andFreedoms than the legislature. t
What is surprising about this development is not that Canadians deem
judges more competent or trustworthy than politicians, but instead that
the very contrary intent of the notwithstanding clause has been overrun
by political culture. This demonstrates an important point about the
process of constitutionalization: it is profoundly problematic, both as a
matter of theory and as a matter of civil stability, to impose a vision of
constitutionalism on a people who do not share that vision." 9 This Canadian
illustration is also a curious instance of political culture resisting-and
indeed erecting an impregnable barrier between itself and-constitutional
structure.
It therefore seems that the relationship between constitutional structure
and political culture is much more complicated than our original inquiry
suggested. It does an injustice, in two ways, to the richness of the matter
to ask whether culture follows from structure or whether structure follows
from culture. First, it assumes a linearity to the answer when the actual
answer may in fact reveal non-linear dimensions. Second, it presupposes
that the relationship is unidirectional such that either culture must govern
structure or that structure must govern culture, when it may more likely be
the case that the relationship is multi-directional.

114. Janet Hiebert, "The Evolution of the Limitation Clause" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 103 at
107-24.
115. Barbara Billingsley, "Section 33: The Charter's Sleeping Giant" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access
Jus. 331 at 339-41.
116. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, "Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy" (2003) 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 451 at 468-69.
117. Joseph Fletcher & Paul Howe, "Public Opinion and the Courts" (2000) 6 Choices 4 at 5-22,
online: <http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol6no3.pdf>; Kirk Makin, "Judges Garner Greater
Trust than Politicians, Survey Finds" Globe and Mail (9 April 2007) A5.
118. Andrew Parkin, "The Charter and Judicial Activism" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 361
at 370.
119. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, "The Permeability of Constitutional Borders" (2004) 82 Tex. L. Rev.
1763 at 1775-76.
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While it may perhaps be true that constitutional structures affect
political behaviour, 2 ° or alternatively that constitutional culture is a
prerequisite to constitutionalism,12' one need not necessarily accept one and
reject the other. It is a tempting, but ultimately false, dichotomy. Perhaps
the better construction is to grant that the constitutional dimensions of
political life are intricately interconnected with the democratic dimensions
of constitutional culture. 22 This helps explain why the adoption of a
new constitutional regime in an emerging democracy does not in and of
itself instill the rule of law in the people and their elected or appointed
agents.
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This interpretation has at least two virtues. First, it adopts a convenient
intermediate position along the linear universe ofoptions between believing,
on the one hand, that constitutional structure controls political culture
and, on the other, that political culture shapes constitutional structure.
Second, and perhaps more importantly for answering our inquiry, this
intermediate position recognizes that although the relationship between
constitutional structure and political culture may have theoretical answers
and implications, it is at its core an empirical question that is amenable to
real answers from real people who enjoy real constitutional protections
and are similarly subject to real constitutional constraints. This is a field
ripe for empirical research. But at the very least we can stipulate that
constitutional structure and political culture are deeply interconnected in
more than one way, one of which is that the former may help shape the
content of the latter and create the conditions for its development.
It seems intuitively clear, however, that in order for a national
constitution to become part of the national identity, it must be regarded
as legitimate in the eyes of the people and in turn must form at least
part of the basis for connecting the people to the state and to each other.
Though it remains unfulfilled, this is what some once hoped for the new
post-Cold War Russian federation. 2 4 To be sure, it is the aspiration of all
democracies. In the Part to follow, I move the discussion from the general to
the specific, transitioning from constitutional culture to specific examples
120. Roger B. Myerson, "Economic Analysis of Constitutions: The Strategic Constitution" (2000) 67
U. Chicago L. Rev. 925 at 928-29.
121. Peter Krug, "Civil Defamation Law and the Press in Russia: Private and Public Interests, the
1995 Civil Code, and the Constitution" (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 297 at 336-37.
122. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, "Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power" (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. I at 3.
123. Elizabeth F. Defeis, "Elections and Democracy: Armenia, a Case Study" (1998) 20 Loy. L.A.
Int'l & Comp. L.J. 455 at 455.
124. Alexander M. Yakovlev, "Russia: On the Crossroad of History" (1997) 11 Emory Int'l L. Rev. I
at8.
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of constitutionalism that, in my view, impede the societal progress toward
a sustainable constitutional culture anchored in participatory democracy.
III. Constitutionaldesign
Constructing participatory democracy is a daunting proposition. It must
necessarily be a bottom-up invention that springs from people who engage
with others in their community yet it also requires top-down direction from
the state- in order to lay the foundation for it to flourish. 125 Participatory
democracy emerges in several ways. One of those is the design of
constitutional structures that inspire or advance the possibility of a culture
of participatory democracy.
For instance, federalism may facilitate the creation of participatory
democracy. 126 This devolution of government authority serves the
interest of civic engagement.127 In dividing the nation-state into subnational units, federalism increases the prospect of broad and meaningful
discourse by shrinking the space within which popular discourse and
deliberation occurs. 28 It does so by expanding the range of opportunities
for individuals to shape their community in concert with their fellow
citizens. 2 9 Participation at the sub-sub-national level may be preferable to
participation at the sub-national level precisely for the same reasons that
participation at the sub-national level may be preferable to participation at
30
the national level.1

Another structural constitutional design that may facilitate participatory
democracy is subsidiarity. This modem structural arrangement derives

125. Karen Morrow, "Megamall on the Hudson: Planning, Wal-Mart, and Grassroots Resistance"
(2004) 16 J. Envtl. L. 147.
126. Justin Long, "Intermittent State Constitutionalism" (2006) 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 41 at 47; Dan T.
Coenen, "Institutional Arrangements and Individual Rights: A Comment on Professor Tribe's Critique
of the Modem Court's Treatment of Constitutional Liberty" (2001) 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1159 at 1187;
Gerald L. Neuman, "The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited" (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630
at 1636; Larry Kramer, "Understanding Federalism" (1994) 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 at 1490.
127. Michael W. McConnell, "Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?" (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2387 at 2395.
128. AdenoAddis, "Constitutionalizing Deliberative Democracy in Multilingual Societies" (2007) 25
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 117 at 150.
129. Richard B. Stewart, "Federalism and Rights" (1985) 19 Ga. L. Rev. 917 at 918.
130. Robert A. Schapiro, "Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism" (2005) 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243 at
271-72.
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from Catholic social thought' and is perhaps most clearly illustrated in
the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union.3 2 It requires that public
decisions be made at the lowest level of popular association possible.'33
For example, where local community groups cannot effectively resolve
a question of public policy, only then should municipal or sub-national
governments be tasked with addressing it, and the national government
should intervene only where these lower levels of government need
34
direction or where it could perform an important coordinating role.
Subsidiarity establishes a presumption in favour of public participation
in the political process. 5 Its animating ambition is to bring decisionmaking as close as possible to individuals.'36 It enhances the possibilities
for participation in matters of local interest.'37 Subsidiary is, at its roots,
a strategy deployed to decentralize decision-making.'38 By reducing the
space within which participation can occur, subsidiarity furthers the
prospect of regular interaction among individuals on important subjects,
improves popular monitoring of public officials, and gives easier access to
governmental agents. 39 In this way, the principle of subsidiarity reinforces
self-determination and accountability, 14 political autonomy at the local or

131. Gregory R. Beabout & Mary Catherine Hodes, "John Paul II on the Relationship Between Civil
Law and the Moral Law: Understanding Evangelium Vitae in Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity
and the Moral Grammar of John Paul II" (2007) 21 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 71 at 82;
Jared Bayer, "Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in
the United States" (2004) 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 1421 at 1423; Albert Breton et al., "Decentralization and
Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation" (1998) 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 21 at 21 n.2; W.
Gary Vause, "The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American Federalism Compared"
(1995) 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 61 at 63.
132. Mattias Kumm, "To be a European Citizen? The Absence of Constitutional Patriotism and the
Constitutional Treaty" (2005) 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 481 at 499-502.
133. Kevin D. Makowski, "Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on
Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union" (1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 155 at 159.
134. Robert K. Vischer, "Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution" (2001) 35
Ind. L .Rev. 103 at 103-07.
135. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "'New Governance' in Legal Thought.and in the World: Some Splitting
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471 at 490; Christoph Henkel, "The
Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Closer Look at the Principle of Subsidiarity" (2002)
20 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 359 at 383-84.
136. Bozena Ziedalski, "What Does it Mean to be a European Citizen and Why the Concept of
European Citizenship is Important to the European Union?" (2000) 6 New Eng. Int'l & Comp. L.
Ann. 63 at 73.
137. Judith Resnik, "Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's
Multiple Ports of Entry" (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1564 at 1577-78.
138. Michael Lower, "John Paul 11and Employee Participation in Corporate Governance" (2007) 21
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y Ill at 145.
139. Yishai Blank, "Spheres of Citizenship" (2007) 8 Theo. Inq. L. 411 at 423, n.26.
140. George A. Bermann, "Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community
and the United States" (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 332 at 340.
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regional level 4 and makes it more likely that decisional outcomes reflect
community preferences 4 1 (although it is true that subsidiarity itself as a
principle does not tell us how to determine which level of government is
best equipped to resolve a question of public policy' 43 ).
Just as there are constitutional structures that invite participation from
citizens, there are constitutional design strategies that actually, though
perhaps not intentionally, discourage popular participation. There are
several examples of these kinds of constitutional structures in the modem
constitutionalized world-structures whose theoretical underpinnings
impede participatory democracy by erecting barriers of incommensurability
between the citizen and the state on the one hand and, on the other,
between the citizen and her fellow citizens. These constitutional designs
work a severe harm on the prospect of civic engagement and moreover
erode the psychological connection between the state and the citizen, the
very connection from which the state derives its legitimacy. I call these
constitutional designs examples of counterconstitionalism.
In the two Sections to follow, I will illustrate two forms of
counterconstitutionalism: contraconstitutionalism and supraconstitutionalism. I will introduce the concept of contraconstitutionalism in the
context of constitutional bills of rights. I will argue that there are at least
four types of constitutional bills of rights in the world. Of those four, one
is agnostic to participatory democracy, two help achieve participatory
democracy to different degrees, and one kind of bill of rights-the
aspirational bill of rights-is contraconstitutional because it undermines
the promise of participatory democracy.
I will also introduce the concept of supraconstitutionalism with two
illustrations: unamendability clauses and superstatutes. I will argue that
the former are counterconstitutional because they place the constitution
beyond the reach of the people, and therefore undermine participatory
democracy. And I will argue that superstatutes are not counterconstitutional,
precisely because they are attentive to popular participation in the design
and elaboration of constitutional commitments.

141. Karolina Rostek & Gareth Davies, "The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship
Policies" (2007) 22 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 89 at I11.
142. Edward T. Swaine, "Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice"
(2000) 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. I at 52.
143. Edith Brown Weiss, "The Rise or the Fall of International Law?" (2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 345
at 362-63.
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1. Contraconstitutionalism
There are four archetypes for enshrining constitutional bills of rights: (1)
discrete bills of rights; (2) catalytic bills of rights; (3) aspirational bills
of rights; and (4) pragmatic bills of rights. Each differs from the other
in material ways, including the purpose of constitutionalism, the content
and function of constitutions, and the role of the state in making real the
promise of constitutionalism. In this subsection, I will introduce these
four archetypes of constitutional bills of rights and argue that aspirational
bills of rights are contraconstitutional.
a. Discrete bills of rights
The first archetype is a discrete bill of rights. A discrete bill of rights simply
fulfills, or aims to fulfill, the elementary purpose of constitutionalism.
Recall that the purpose of constitutionalism is to create the structures of
the state, to delimit the boundaries of citizenship, and to define the statecitizen border. Discrete constitutions do no more than this. They state the
enforceable rights and freedoms of citizens in relation to the state. They
may also apply reasonable limitations to those rights and freedoms in times
of war, emergency or other extraordinary circumstances. Discrete bills of
rights are narrowly tailored in scope and widely accessible in language.
They are simple documents that convey a simple, though nonetheless
powerful, message to readers. Examples of discrete bills of rights include
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the German Basic Law, and
the Jamaican Constitution.
Let us begin with the paradigmatic model of a discrete bill of rights:
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. One need only read the
preamble to discern the fundamental feature of discrete constitutionalism.
The preamble asserts that the purpose of the document is to set forth, in a
solemn declaration, the natural and inalienable rights of persons in order
to remind those persons of their own rights against the state. The preamble
also gives notice to the state that those persons have been informed of their
rights and therefore directs the state to act accordingly to not contravene
and instead to stand in defense of those rights."' Notice-giving is the
principal characteristic of discrete constitutionalism. It puts the state on
notice that citizens have been informed of their rights.
A second feature of a discrete bill of rights is that the rights enshrined
in the constitutional text do not venture beyond the conventional sampling
of simple and non-controversial ones, for instance the rights to equality,

144. Dclaration des droits de I'homme et du citoyen, 1789, prfambule.
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free expression, religious freedom, as well as criminal defense rights. 145
Of all constitutional rights, criminal defense rights are perhaps the most
emblematic of a discrete bill of rights insofar as they embody the essence
of the state-citizen boundary.
The Jamaican Constitution is another example of a discrete bill of
rights. In addition to preserving fundamental rights such as the rights to
expression, religious freedom, assembly and association, the Jamaican
Bill of Rights takes great care to outline in exquisite detail the protections
guaranteed during criminal prosecution. The provisions range from
the right to be informed about the reasons for arrest or detention, to be
granted a fair hearing, to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise,
and not to be prosecuted pursuant to ex postfacto laws. 46 These and other
rights in the constitutional text are intended to accomplish one objective:
to inform those subject to the authority of the state of their rights and
obligations, and to have at their disposal a readily comprehensible record
of those rights and obligations. The Jamaican Constitution does not aspire
to achieve anything more than this. It is simply a notice-giving document
that is meant to inform.
Further to these two examples, the Basic Rights in the German Basic
Law may also be classified under this category. However, the German
selection of constitutional rights is distinguishable from the French and
Jamaican models because it both constrains and instructs the state. For
instance, it constrains the state by making human rights inviolable and
by erecting barriers that prevent the state from violating the sanctity of
the home. 147 In contrast, the Basic Law also establishes a societal vision
according to which the state must govern itself. For example, the Basic
Law commands that the state must support the family and, in particular,
mothers. 48 It also supports religious instruction in private schools. 49 Yet
the Basic Law remains, at its core, a discrete bill of rights because it is
mostly concerned with outlining fundamental civil and political rights,
including rights that attach in the criminal process. 510
b. Aspirationalbills of rights
The leading antagonist of a discrete bill of rights is an aspirational bill of
rights. Contrary to a discrete bill of rights, an aspirational bill of rights
145. D&laration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, articles VII, VIII, IX, (1789).
146. Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962, C. III, arts. 22, 21, 23, 15(2), 20(1), (5), (7)
respectively.
147. The Basic Law of the FederalRepublic of Germany, 1949, c. I, arts. 1(2), 13(1) [Basic Law].
148. Ibid., arts. 6(1), (4).
149. Ibid., art. 7.
150. Ibid., c. IX, arts. 101-04.
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does not satisfy itself with simple statements of citizen rights and freedoms
from state action. Yes, an aspirational bill of rights enshrines fundamental
rights of expression, religious freedoms, equality and, among others,
criminal defense protections. But it endeavours to do more than this. An
aspirational bill of rights speaks broadly in ambitious language, rejects the
existing limitations of contemporary society as it is, and instead reaches
far into the future to envision society as it could be. As a consequence, an
aspirational bill of rights articulates a commitment to delivering social
and economic rights to its citizenry. Such rights include the right to social
security, housing, food, health care, and a healthy environment.
Models of aspirational constitutionalism include the Constitution of
52
the Republic ofPoland,151 the Constitutionofthe Republic of Uzbekistan,
53 Consider first the Polish
and the Constitutionof the Republic ofBelarus."
constitution. It safeguards the conventional protections, including assembly,
association, expression, equality, religious belief, freedom of the press,
freedom from torture, and, among others, criminal defence protections,
freedom of the press.' 54 Yet the Polish constitution also protects these
following social and economic rights: (1) the right to a minimum wage;
(2) employment; (3) paid holiday and vacation; (4) social security; (5)
health care; (6) education; (7) a healthy environment; and among others
55
(8) housing.'
The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan is similar. It protects
the rights to equality, speech, conscience and religion, criminal defence
safeguards and, among others, association.' 5 6 Yet it ventures beyond this
conventional list to also enshrine the rights to employment, paid vacations,
social security, health care and education, 57 and others.
As a final example of the second archetype of constitutional bills of
rights-an aspirational bill of rights-consider the Constitution of the
Republic of Belarus. The state pledges to guarantee a bundle of rights,
including the right to equality, free expression, free movement, assembly,
association, and criminal defense protections.' 58 Belarus also pledges
to guarantee the right to food, clothing, housing, a steadily improving
standard of life, full employment of the citizenry, minimum wage, paid

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Dziennik Ustaw (1997) No. 78, item 483 [Constitutionof Poland].
1992 [Constitutionof Uzbekistan].
1996 [Constitution of Belarus].
Constitutionof Poland,c. II, arts. 57, 58, 54, 32, 53, 40-45; c. I, art. 14 respectively.
Ibid., c. 11,arts. 65(4), (1), 66(2), 67, 68(1)-(3), 70, 74(2), 75 respectively.
ConstitutionofUzbekistan, c. 5, art. 18; c. 7, arts. 29, 31, 25-26; and c. 8, art. 34 respectively.
Ibid., c. 9, arts. 37-41.
ConstitutionofBelarus, § 2, arts. 21, 33, 30, 35-36, 25-27, 62 respectively.
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vacation, property, free health care, a healthy environment and, among
others, free elementary, secondary and vocational education. 519
c.

Catalyticbills of rights
The third archetype is a catalytic bill of rights. A catalytic bill of
rights privileges the political process and intends to pull the citizen into
that process. It therefore goes beyond merely fulfilling the simple purpose
of constitutionalism. In addition to creating the structures of the state,
delimiting the boundaries of citizenship and defiming the state-citizen
border, a catalytic bill of rights seeks to trigger civic engagement by
inviting citizens to be active participants in the process of self-definition
that constitutionalism entails. A catalytic bill of rights therefore deploys a
targeted strategy to achieve the promise of constitutionalism. That strategy
is to prompt popular participation in giving content and meaning to the
freedoms and protections enshrined in its bill of rights.
Two contemporary exemplars of catalytic bills of rights are the United
Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Human Rights Act'6" came into force in 2000 and directly
incorporated the rights and freedoms enshrined in the EuropeanConvention
on Human Rights16 1 into the law of the United Kingdom.' 62 Its enactment
was partly the culmination of a campaign against the unwritten nature of
rights in United Kingdom. 63 It was received as a momentous document
that heralded a new era of constitutionalism for the United Kingdom.' 6
The Human Rights Act is like most other bills of rights in that it
preserves conventional civil and political rights, namely expression,
165
religious freedom, assembly, equality, and criminal defense protections.
But it departs from typical bills of rights by requiring courts to interpret
legislation in a way that is compatible with the rights it enshrines." 6 This
effectively requires courts to interpret legislative enactments in way that
permits them to withstand judicial scrutiny. But where a court determines

159. Ibid., arts. 21, 41, 43-46,49 respectively.
160. Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [Human Rights Act].
161. Conventionfor the Protectionof Human Rights andFundamentalFreedoms,4 November 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5 [ECHR].
162. Christopher D. Jenkins, "The Institutional and Substantive Effects of the Human Rights Act in
the United Kingdom" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 218 at 219.
163. Conor Gearty, "Reflections on Human Rights and Civil Liberties in Light of the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998" (2001) 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. I at 17.
164. Janet L. Hiebert, "Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting
Rights?" (2004) 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1963 at 1976.
165. Human Rights Act,, s. 1(a).
166. Ibid., s. 3(1): "So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights."
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that it is not possible to read a given statute in a way that is consistent with
the civil and political rights guaranteed in the Human Rights Act, that court
may then issue what the Act calls a declaration of incompatibility. 167 This
is similar to invalidating a law as unconstitutional. Yet it is only similar
to judicial invalidation-and not quite exactly that-because the Human
Rights Act makes declarations of incompatibility only advisory insofar as
they do not compel Parliament to revise the law into conformity with the
judicial determination. 6 Instead, Parliament may take the judicial decision
into consideration and weigh the choice whether to ignore the judicial
declaration of incompatibility or to amend the legislation. 6 9 The ultimate
decision of Parliament is very likely to correspond to public opinion.
Another example of a catalytic bill of rights is the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms. Adopted in 1982, the Charterconfers freedoms
of conscience and religion, expression, assembly, association, the right to
equality, and criminal defense protections, 7 among others. But it contains
two provisions that classify the Charteras a catalytic bill of rights. First,
the Chartercontains a limitations clause pursuant to which'Parliament or a
provincial legislature may engage in a dialogic exchange with a court about
the permissible scope of a Charterright or freedom. 7' Second, the Charter
contains a clause that authorizes Parliament or a provincial legislature
to suspend for up to five years the application of a judicial decision that
interprets a Charterright or freedom.172 This power allows a legislature to
effectively overrule a court judgment on the meaning of a right or freedom
contained in the Charter.It is very unlikely that a legislature would invoke
the clause if doing so would run counter to public opinion.
d. Pragmaticbills of rights
The fourth model is a pragmatic bill of rights, which Cass Sunstein has
described in his study of constitutional texts. 7 A pragmatic bill of rights
167. Ibid., s. 4(2): "If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right,
it may make a declaration of that incompatibility."
168. Ibid, s. 6(a).
169. Ibid., s. 19.
170. CanadianCharter,supra note I10, ss. 2(a)-(d), 15(l), 7-13.
171. Ibid., s. I: "The CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."
172. Ibid., s. 33(1): "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter."
173. Cass R. Sunstein, "American Advice and New Constitutions" (2000) 1 Chicago J. Int'' L. 173
at 180, 186-87. Sunstein's body of scholirship on constitutionalism has been exceedingly influential
on my analysis about these categories of constitutionalism and in conceptualizing the promise of
constitutionalism.
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recognizes that the state has an important role to discharge in improving
the life of its constituents. But it acknowledges both that the state may
not always have at its disposal the necessary public resources to fulfill
this mandate and that the allocation of fmite public funds may be a nonjusticiable political matter. Pragmatic constitutionalism therefore requires
the state to do what is within its economic capacity and available resources
in order to move progressively toward such objectives as delivering social
security, housing, food, health care and a clean environment to its citizenry.
Models of pragmatic constitutionalism include the Irish, Indian and South
African constitutions.
Consider first the Constitution of Ireland. The text of the Irish
constitution enshrines several rights and privileges that venture beyond
conventional civil and political rights, including those ensuring adequate
means of livelihood, protecting the weaker segments of the population,
working toward an equitable distribution of material wealth among private
individuals and social classes, pledging economic security for families, and
finding suitable employment for individuals. 7 4 These are all paradigmatic
examples of constitutionalizing social and economic aspirations that the
state has for its people. Yet these aspirations are also constrained in very
important ways by the constitutional text itself. These rights and privileges
are bounded by a clause that expressly makes them unenforceable and
non-justiciable, and identifies them as forward-looking directives of social
policy that should only guide, but not bind, the national legislature, which
is called the Oireachtas.'75
Now let us turn to the Indian constitution. Like the Irish constitution, the
Indian constitution preserves a number of aspirational rights and privileges.
The principal difference is that the Indian menu is more far-reaching
than the Irish one. The Indian constitution declares that citizens should
174. Constitution of Ireland 1937. Art. 45(2)(1): "That the citizens (all of whom, men and women
equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood) may through their occupations find the
means of making the reasonable provision for their domestic needs"; art. 45(4)(i): "The State pledges
itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community
and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the aged";
art. 45(2)(ii): "That the ownership and control of the material resources of the community may be so
distributed amongst private individuals and the various classes as best to subserve the common good";
art. 45(2)(v): "That there may be established on the land in economic security as many families as in
the circumstances shall be practicable"; art. 45(4)(ii): "The State shall endeavour to ensure that the
strength and health of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children shall not be abused and
that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their sex, age or
strength."
175. Ibid., art. 45: "Directive Principles of Social Policy. The principles of social policy set forth in
this Article are intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles
in the making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by
any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution."
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have an ever-increasing standard of living and public health conditions,
a clean environment, leisure as well social and cultural opportunities,
the right to education and to work, suitable employment, humane work
conditions, an adequate means of livelihood, healthy conditions in which
to develop, free legal assistance, and modernized agriculture. The state is
also constitutionally directed to address various forms of economic and
6
social inequality.11
This is an ambitious range of social, cultural and economic rights. Were
any state capable of fulfilling them in their entirety, one could beforgiven
for mistaking that state as utopian. Indeed, in order for any state to achieve
these conditions for its citizenry, the state must devote significant financial
and human resources that it may not have at its disposal. That is precisely
why the Indian constitution makes these and other aspirational rights in the
constitution contingent on the economic capacity of the state. Specifically,
the Indian state is required only to consider these objectives as directive
principles in its formulation of state policy. The Indian constitution

176. Constitution of India, 1950, art. 47: "The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition
and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary
duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption
except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health"; art.
48A: "The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests
and wildlife of the country"; art. 43: "The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation
or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise,
work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment. of
leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote
cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas"; art. 41: "The State shall,
within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing
the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness
and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want"; art. 39(e): "The State shall, in particular,
direct its policy towards securing that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the
tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter
avocations unsuited to their age or strength"; art. 42: "The State shall make provision for securing just
and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief'; art. 39(a): "The State shall, in particular,
direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an
adequate means of livelihood"; art. 39(t): "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards
securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in
conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation
and against moral and material abandonment"; art. 39A: "The State shall secure that the operation
of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide
free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities"; art. 48: "The
State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modem and scientific lines and
shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of
cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle"; art. 38(2): "The State shall, in particular, strive to
minimise the inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also
amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations."
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consequently removes these aspirational rights from the purview of the
judiciary and thus renders them unenforceable as a matter of law.'I"
A more recent example of pragmatic constitutionalism is the South
African constitution of 1996. The text includes provisions that are common
to both the Irish and Indian constitutions. For instance, the document
declares that citizens have the right to a clean environment.I" It enshrines
the right to adequate housing, heath care, food and water, social assistance,
education, and legal assistance. It also seeks to promote a concretized right
to property ownership.'79 Just as in the Irish and Indian constitutions, these
aspirational rights are qualified by an important proviso that recognizes
that the state may not have the necessary resources to actually satisfy
these constitutional promises, which is why the South African constitution
conditions these rights on available resources and instead only encourages
the state to work toward the progressive realization of those rights. 80 The
South African constitution also includes another significant qualifier to
this grand vision of citizenship. This interesting tool is a limitations clause
that permits the state to derogate from rights where it may be justifiable or
defensible to do so in light of particular circumstances. 8 '
e. Constitutionalismand constitutionalculture
When measured against the promise of constitutionalism, these four
archetypes for enshrining constitutional bills of rights exhibit different
strengths and weaknesses. Some of them satisfy the promise of
constitutionalism and others may actually undermine it. In this subsection,

177. Ibid., art. 37: "The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall
be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws."
178. Constitution of the Republic ofSouth Africa, No. 108 of 1996, c. 2, s. 24 reads: "Everyone has
the right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and (b) to have the
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative
and other measures that (ii) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation;
and (iii). secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting
justifiable economic and social development."
179. Ibid., ss. 26(1), 27(1), 29, 35(3)(g), 25(5) respectively. "The State must take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain
access to land on an equitable basis."
180. See e.g. ibid., ss. 26(2), 27(2), 29(l)(b) which state that the state must take measures "within its
available resources" to achieve the "progressive realization" of these rights or that the state must take
measures to make them "progressively available and accessible."
181. Ibid., s. 36(1): "The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extend that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account relevant factors including
(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent
of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means
to achieve the purpose."
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I will advance three arguments. First, I will argue that a discrete bill of
rights is agnostic on participatory democracy. Second, I will contend that
an aspirational bill of rights paradoxically works a significant harm upon
participatory democracy. Finally, I will also argue that both catalytic and
pragmatic bills of rights enhance the prospect of cultivating participatory
democracy. Let me begin with discrete constitutionalism.
Discrete bills of rights do not take aposition on the merits ofparticipatory
constitutionalism. They take a reductionist view of constitutionalism,
believing that the constitutional text should set forth no more than is
necessary to satisfy the very basic purpose of constitutionalism. Discrete
bills of rights neither promote nor obstruct participatory democracy. In
comparison to other kinds of bills of rights, they take no affirmative steps
to seal or intensify the bond between the citizen and her state nor do they
create any distance between the citizen and her state. Admittedly, even
a dispassionate form of constitutionalism contributes to the state-citizen
relationship insofar as the constitutional text is often part of a series of
strategies deployed by-the state and its leaders to create a constitutional
culture that respects the rule of law. Nonetheless, a discrete bill of rights
cannot be said to serve participatory democracy precisely because it adopts
a detached posture in relation to it.
On the other hand, a catalytic bill of rights does indeed enhance the
prospect of participatory democracy. It brings the citizen squarely and
immediately into the constitutional fold, enabling her to ascertain her rights
and freedoms, discern the line that the state may not cross, and identify the
ways in which she may engage her fellow citizens to change the terms of
state-citizen boundary. Catalytic bills of rights invite citizens to participate
in public constitutional discourse in tangible ways that may have very
real consequences. For example, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act
contemplates that public pressure may play an important role in persuading
Parliament to conform to judicial declarations of incompatibility.
Similarly, the notwithstanding clause in the Canadian Charter of
Rights andFreedoms likewise advances participation because it authorizes
legislatures to stand in defense of public choice in the face of a disagreeing
court. Legislators will not use the clause without measuring public feeling
on the matter, which encourages civic engagement on important issues of
the day. In this way, both bills of rights are catalytic insofar as they are
designed to spur participation in the public discourse. They both open the
legislative and political processes to citizens should they wish to change
the meaning and content of their rights. This kind of collective action is
possible under a catalytic bill of rights because it encourages citizens to
become civically engaged. Catalytic bills of rights establish a baseline-not
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a ceiling-from which citizens can envision a fuller conception of rights
that can be changed by participating in the political process.
In contrast, aspirational bills of rights-which enshrine social,
economic and cultural rights in addition to the conventional menu of
civil and political rights-do not enhance participatory democracy. An
aspirational bill of rights may sometimes be nothing but a list of unrealistic
promises. For instance, if an aspirational bill of rights enshrines the right
to a healthy environment but the state does not possess the necessary
public funds to undertake environmental cleaning projects and to pursue
environmental sustainability strategies, that particular constitutional
promise becomes unenforceable.
This runs the very real risk of evaporating from the text of the
aspirational bill of rights all substantive force, and with it the hope for
cultivating a citizenry that abides by and moreover respects the law. For
if the constitutional text promises a clean environment yet people witness
their neighbours stricken by illnesses caused by the polluted air they
breathe, the impure water they drink or the contaminated food they eat,
citizens will come to no other conclusion but that the constitution does not
mean what it says. The consequences will be dire for the rule of law, the
future of constitutionalism in that troubled jurisdiction, and the prospect of
participatory democracy because citizens will lose faith in the institutions
of the state, and in the capacity of the state to improve their lives."8 2
The final model for constitutionalizing rights is the pragmatic bill
of rights. Recall that the pragmatic bill of rights embraces the view that
the state has important positive duties toward citizens, for instance the
enduring task of improving their quality of life. But a pragmatic bill of
rights acknowledges that the state may not always be capable of fulfilling
those duties because of financial constraints. Like the catalytic bill of
rights, a pragmatic bill of rights favours the participatory element of
constitutionalism by encouraging citizens to develop and sustain their own
constitutional culture.
The Indian judgment in Tellis51 3 is a vivid example of pragmatic
constitutionalism at work. The Tellis Court ruled in favor of a group of
women and men who argued that the right to life is illusory without the
means of livelihood. In issuing its ruling, the Court acknowledged that
the social and economic rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution are
182. One study of aspirational constitutionalism concludes both that courts hesitate to enforce
aspirational rights and that the quality of life of disadvantaged citizens does not improve under an
aspirational bill of rights. See Frank B. Cross, "The Error of Positive Rights" (2001) 48 U.C.L.A. Rev.
857 at 893-900.
183. Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1986) A.I.R. 180 (India S.C.).
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subject to legislative discretion insofar as the state's ability to fulfill those
rights must be considered within the limits of its economic capacity. The
Court therefore drew an important balance between satisfying the enshrined
rights of citizens and recognizing the constraints that finite resources bring
to bear on the ability of the state to fully satisfy those rights.
The South African constitution also offered a similar escape allowing
the state to avoid a potential quagmire when a suit was filed requesting
a judicial order to provide a medical service that the state did not have
the funds to provide. 8 4 The Soobramoney Court dismissed a claim
demanding renal dialysis from a hospital whose budget simply could not
afford it. The Court acknowledged that the South African Constitution
guarantees medical treatment but neutralized this right by reference to a
related provision that conditioned the right to medical treatment on the
state's available resources. This is an example of a constitution enshrining
aspirational rights but expressly limiting them to the realm of practicality.
The virtue of pragmatic constitutionalism is that it does not defer
blindly to legislative choice. Quite the contrary: it calls upon the judiciary
to probe the reasoning given by the state as to why it is unable to fulfill
a socio-economic right guaranteed in the constitution. The South African
Constitutional Court performed this important duty in a recent case in
which it concluded that the impugned state agency had failed to make
reasonable provision within its available resources for claimants seeking
adequate housing. 185 In this case, the Court vindicated the aspirational
right to adequate housing that is enshrined in South Africa's pragmatic
bill of rights. This is an example of the critical supervisory function that
the Court can discharge only if it is regarded in the national consciousness
as a legitimate authority. The. judiciary must also have the requisite
political capital to compel state remedial action in response to one of its
judgments.
This model of constitutionalizing rights captures the most laudable
elements of other categories of bills of rights. First, it privileges legislative
choice and popularwill. Second, it paints a vision of rights that is aspirational
and that inspires hope among citizens that the nation will one day reach
its full promise of liberty and social progress. But, third, it moderates
those aspirational rights with a clause that limits the fulfillment of those
rights within the scope of the possible and readily achievable. The result

184. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazuln-Natal), (1997) [1998] 1 S.A. 765 [1997] 12
B.C.L.R. 1696 (S.A.C.C.).
185. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, (2000), [2001] 1 S. Aft. L.R. 46,
[2000] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1169 (S. Aft. Const. Ct.).
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is salutary for citizenship because-unlike constitutional models that fail
to see a constitution as a vehicle for improving the lives of the citizenry,
and unlike constitutional models that are not grounded in practicalitythe pragmatic model creates manageable expectations of rights within the
rule of law, all the while cultivating a sustainable constitutional culture of
participatory democracy.
2. Supraconstitutionalism
Having argued that there are four archetypes of constitutional bills of
rights-one of which is contraconstitutional and therefore undermines
the promise of constitutionalism-I now turn to the notion of
supraconstitutionalism. This section will argue that unamendability
clauses are supraconstitutional elements that frustrate the possibility
of participatory democracy because they make certain constitutional
guarantees unchangeable. Although they do so in the service of important
principles of personhood and community, these supraconstitutional
provisions are nonetheless counterconstitutional. I will subsequently
use unamendability clauses as a foil to argue that superstatutes are not
supraconstitutional. Quite the contrary, as I will demonstrate, superstatutes
capture the very essence of participatory democracy.
a. Unamendability
The term unamendability describes a constitutional provision that is
impervious, to amendment. Its resistance to any attempt to amend it-this
special quality of unamendability-derives from an express statement of
unamendability in the constitutional text. Unamendable provisions are
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also called eternity,8 6 perpetuity," 7 entrenchment,' or nonamendable'8 9
clauses. Unamendability also includes judicially-constructed doctrines
pursuant to which the judiciary proclaims that some part or provision of the
constitution is unamendable 90 For our purposes, I will refer to all of these
forms of unamendability as unamendable or unamendability clauses.
It is critical to distinguish my understanding of unamendability clauses
from competing conceptions of these clauses. First, I regard unamendability
clauses as different from constitutional provisions that simply lack an
amendment formula or procedure, as in the Concluding and Interim
Provisions of the Russian constitution.' 9' These are not unamendability
clauses for they remain amendable by some procedure even though that
particular procedure may not be outlined in the constitutional text. I also
wish to distinguish unamendability clauses from those constitutional
clauses that simply establish supermajorities for revising or repealing

186. See e.g. Peter L. Linseth, "A History of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945" (2007) 25 L.H.R.
229 at 229-30; Robert J. Delahunty, "The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why do American and European
Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?" (2006) 4 Loy. Int'J L. Rev. II at 29-30; James J. Killean,
"Der grobetae Lauschangriff: Germany Brings Home the War on Organized Crime" (2000) 23
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 173 at 186-87; Donald P. Kommers, "German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon" (1991) 40 Emory L.J. 837 at 846.
187. See e.g. Gunnar Beck "The Idea of Human Rights Between Value Pluralism and Conceptual
Vagueness" (2007) 25 Penn. St. Int'l L. Rev. 615 at 615, n. 2; Ruti Teitel, "Transitional Jurisprudence:
The Role of Law in Political Transformation" (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2009 at 2060, n. 205; Richard Stith,
"Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Extraordinary Power of Nepal's Supreme Court"
(1996) 11 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 47 at 48 n.5.
188. See e.g. Scott J. Bowman, "Wild Political Dreaming: Constitutional Reformation of the United
States Senate" (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1017 at 1028; Alexander Hanebeck, "Democracy Within
Federalism: An Attempt to Reestablish Middle Ground" (2000) 37 San Diego L. Rev. 347 at 363; John
R. Vile, "Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment Since United States v. Darby"
(1996) 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 445 at 496.
189. See e.g. Samuel Issacharoff, "Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies" (2004) 82
Tex. L. Rev. 1861 at 1862; William E. Forbath, "The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy
and Amendability-A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager" (2003) 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1965 at 1982, n.
65; Vijayashri Sripati, "Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in India:
Looking Back to See Ahead (1950-2000)" (1998) 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 413 at 440 n. 155.
190. See e.g. Upendra Baxi, "Universal Rights and Cultural Pluralism: Constitutionalism as a Site of
State Formative Practices" (2000) 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1183 at 1205, which states that the Supreme
Court of India has designated the basic structure of the Indian constitution as unamendable).
191. See Bakhityar Tuzmukhamedov, "The ICC and Russian Constitutional Provisions" (2005) 3 J.
Int'l Crim. Just. 621, which states that the Russian constitution does not articulate how to amend its
Concluding and Interim Provisions.
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them.'92 Such clauses may be unamendable in practice if they establish
seemingly unattainable supermajorities for amendment. Yet they still
remain amendable in theory. This is a terribly important distinction
that I will elaborate in the pages to follow. Similarly, I do not take
unamendability clauses to include entrenched provisions that are subject
to special legislative, parliamentary or popular procedures for revision or
repeal.193 Finally, I also distinguish unamendability clauses from those
that are widely regarded as virtually unamendable because of onerous or
94
ostensibly unachievable standards for successful amendment.'
There are several examples of unamendability across the global
community of constitutional states. Perhaps the most prominent example
springs from the German Basic Law. This constitutional text makes several
constitutional provisions unamendable, meaning that those provisions are
eternally enshrined in the Basic Law and cannot legitimately be revised
or repealed. The German constitutional prohibition against amendment
reads as follows: "Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division
192. See e.g. Joshua Segev, "Who Needs a Constitution? In Defense of the Non-Decision ConstitutionMaking Tactic in Israel" (2007) 70 Alb. L. Rev. 409 at 446-47, which explores the possibility of
applying a supermajority rule to amending an entrenchment clause; Julie Kamens, "Religious Law
in Israel: The Debate Rages Forth Regarding the Anti-Missionary Bill and the Conversion Bill"
(1999) 13 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 347 at 363, n. 145 which states that entrenchment clauses may be
amended by special majority); Basheva E. Genut, "Competing Visions of the Jewish State: Promoting
and Protecting Freedom of Religion in Israel" (1996) 19 Fordham Int'l L.J. 2120 at 2143 which states
that entrenched provisions may be overturned in Israel only by special majorities of the Knesset,
which is the legislature of Israel.
193. See e.g. Constitutionof the Republic of Ghana, 1996, c. 25, art. 290:
(2) A bill for the amendment of an entrenched provision shall, before Parliament proceeds
to consider it, be referred by the Speaker to the Council of State for its advice and the
Council of State shall render advice on the bill within thirty days after receiving it.
(3) The bill shall be published in the Gazette but shall not be introduced into Parliament
until the expiry of six months after the publication in the Gazette under this clause.
(4) After the bill has been read the first time in Parliament it shall not be proceeded with
further unless it has been submitted to a referendum held throughout Ghana and at
least forty percent of the persons entitled to vote, voted at the referendum and at least
seventy-five percent of the persons who voted cast their votes in favour of the passing
of the bill.
(5) Where the bill is approved at the referendum, Parliament shall pass it.
(6) Where a bill for the amendment of an entrenched provision has been passed by
Parliament in accordance with this article, the President shall assent to it.
194. See e.g. Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, "Promoting Consensus in Society Through DeferredImplementation Agreements" (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 151 at 176; Michael C. Doff, "Legal Indeterminacy
and Institutional Design" (2003) 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 875 at 877; Lawrence Schlam, "State Constitutional
Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional
Stagnation" (1994) 43 DePaul L. Rev. 269 at 359-60; Wendy Turnoff Atrokov, Note, "The Khasavyurt
Accords: Maintaining the Rule of Law and Legitimacy of Democracy in the Russian Federation
Amidst the Chechen Crisis" (1999) 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 367 at 384-85; see also Donald S. Lutz,
"Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment" (1994) 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355 (discussing the
varying degrees of difficulty to amend constitutions of the world).
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of the Federation into Lnder, their participation on principle in the
legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall
be inadmissible."' 95 Although the term unamendable or unamendability
does not figure in this constitutional provision, it is nonetheless an
unamendability clause because it renders ineffective any attempt to amend
certain designated constitutional provisions.
This German unamendability clause is rich in both content and
meaning. First, it declares that Germany must remain permanently
organized as a federal state. This cannot ever change under the existing
constitutional order. Moreover, the sub-national bodies, called Lnder,
must retain a voice in the legislative process in order to give effect to
the federal structure of Germany. This, too, is unamendable. Third, the
unamendability clause refers to both Articles 1 and 20 of the Basic Law,
both of which are themselves just as rich in substance. Article 1 of the
Basic Law preserves the right to human dignity and compels all organs
of the.state to respect and protect this right. 19 6 While Article 1 concerns
a constitutional right, Article 20 concerns constitutional and political
structure. It proclaims that Germany is a democratic federal state that
derives its authority from the freely expressed popular will of the people
through periodic elections.' 97 Sanford Levinson suggests that judicial
constructions of these unamendable German constitutional provisions are
presumably unamendable too.'98
German constitutionalism perceives democracy as rooted in core,
substantive principles that are so deeply elemental to the organization of

195. BasicLaw, supra note 147, c. VII, art. 79(3).
196. Ibid., c. I, art. 1:
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be. the duty of all
state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights
as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary
as directly applicable law.
197. Ibid., c. II, art. 20:
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people
through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and
judicial bodies.
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the
judiciary by law and justice.
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any persons seeking to abolish this
constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.
198. Sanford Levinson, "The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century" (2006) 86 B.U.L. Rev.
1297 at 1300.
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civil society that they arise prior to procedural notions of democracy. 99
There is a historical basis for this view of constitutionalism. The strategy
to entrench federalism in Germany was deployed to mitigate the dangers
of centralism that were made plain not only in the nation but throughout
the world during the period between the first and second world wars.200
Unamendability in the German context was an innovation of the American
constitutional designers who were tasked with helping Germany chart a
new course. 20' Their operating premise was that no German movement
should be permitted to alter certain constitutional provisigns-even if
that movement could muster the requisite majorities or supermajorities to
change the terms of its Basic Law.20 2 As one scholar has argued, this form
of entrenchment was a direct result of-and a necessary response to-the
constitutional and governmental failures that had befallen Germany 2 3
under the previous Weimar Constitution.0 4
In addition to this leading example of unamendability, there exist
others, though they are perhaps not as well known. For example, the
United States has two unamendability clauses in its founding text.20 5 The
first deals with slavery-providing that no amendment may be made until

199. Judith Wise, Comment, "Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the
Banning of the Free German Workers Party" (1998) 5 U. Chicago L. Sch. Roundtable 301 at 302.
200. See Vicki C. Jackson, "Narratives ofFederalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience" (2001) 51 Duke L.J. 223 at 275-76.
201. See Kim Lane Scheppele, "Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations
of 9/11" (2004)6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001 at 1014.
202. See Peter L. Lindseth, "The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and
Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s" (2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1341 at 1388.
203. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy
for the Benefit of Civil Society?" (1998) 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1 at 15.
204. Brendon Troy Ishikawa, "Toward a More Perfect Union: The Role of Amending Formulae in the
United States, Canadian, and German Constitutional Experiences" (1996) 2 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 267 at 283, n. 58.
205. See Vicki C. Jackson, "Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian
Freedoms" (2003) 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 265 at 271; Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, "Intolerant
Democracies" (1995) 36 Harv. Int'l L.J. I at 24, n. 109; Jack M. Balki, "The Constitution as a
Box of Chocolates" (1995) 12 Const. Commentary 147 at 149; Philip Bobbitt, "Parlor Game" (1995)
12 Const. Commentary 151 at 152-53; Douglas H. Bryant, "Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting
the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment" (2002) 53 Ala. L. Rev. 555 at 562; John C. Roberts
& Erwin Chemerinsky, "Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and
Vermeule" (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1773 at 1786-87.
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a certain period has elapsed 2 6-and the second with the organization of
the Senate-holding that each state is guaranteed equal voting power in
the upper chamber.21 7 The Equal Voting Power Clause was based on the
states' insistence on equality 2 8 and was moreover intended to cement the
Connecticut Compromise.2 °9
Likewise, the Italian constitution prohibits any constitutional
amendment to the republican structure of the state. 210 Turkey also has
an unamendability clause.2" The clause deems irrevocable Turkish
republicanism, in addition to the state's democratic and secular nature as
21 2
well as certain concepts that Turkey regards as central to governance.
The Turkish unamendability clause also prevents amendments to the
territory and official language of the state, and its designated flag, national
21 3
anthem and capital.
Several African states have also enshrined unamendability clauses. 21 4
For instance, Namibia makes all of its civil and political rights

206. U.S. Const. art. V: "Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article"; see also ibid., art. I, § 9, cl. 1: "The Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person"; ibid., art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation,
or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."
207. Ibid., art. V: "Provided ... that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate."
208. Dan T. Coenen, "A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of the Federalist and its Impact on
Constitutional Interpretation" (2006) 56 Duke L.J. 469 at 509.
209. Henry Paul Monaghan, "We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment" (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121 at 146.
210. Constitutionof the Italian Republic, 1948, as amended to 2003, Part II, Title VI, s. II, art. 139:
"The republican form [of the state] cannot be a matter of constitutional revision."
211. Constitutionof the Republic of Turkey, 1982, Part I, art. 4: "The provision of Article I of the
Constitution establishing the form of the State as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the
characteristics of the Republic, and the provisions of Article 3 can not be amended, nor can their
amendment be proposed."
212. Ibid., art. I: "The Turkish State is a Republic"; art. 2: "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic,
secular and social State governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace,
national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatiirk, and based
on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble."
213. Ibid., art. 3.
214. See Charles M. Fombad, "Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa
and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa"(2007) 55
Am. J. Comp. L. I at 23.
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unamendable.21 5 None of them is subject to revision or repeal in any way.
Those unamendable rights include human dignity, equality, privacy, speech,
religious freedom, assembly, association, free movement, education,
the right to due process and a fair trial and, among others, the rights
against capital punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention and involuntary
servitude.

216

The Republic of the Congo has adopted a similar entrenchment
approach. The Constitution of the Congo states that the territorial integrity
of the state is unamendable, as are republicanism and secularism and
presidential tenure, in addition to the state's entire inventory of civil
and political rights. 2 17 The Congolese rights are more extensive than the
Namibian ones. Entrenched Congolese rights include the right to life,
equality, due process, access to government, free movement, religious
freedom, expression, assembly, employment, rest and leisure, cultural
identity, education and, among others, the right to a clean environment. 1 8
They also include the presumption of innocence, and rights against torture
219
or inhumane treatment, unreasonable search and forced labour.
While Namibia and the Congo are two of the most enthusiastic
proponents of unamendability, other African states have been more
restrained in constitutionally enshrining unamendability clauses. For
example, Cameroon has made unamendable only its republican form of
government and national borders. 220 In addition to republicanism, the
Gabon Constitution has shielded the pluralist character of its democracy

215. Constitutionof the Republic ofNamibia, 1990, as amended to 1998, c. XIX, art. 131: "No repeal
or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3, in so far as such repeal or amendment diminishes
or detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms contained and defined in that chapter, shall be
permissible under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have
any force or effect."
216. Ibid., arts. 8, 10, 13, 21(l)(a), (c)-(e), (g), 20(l), 7, 12, 6, 11,
respectively.
217. Constitutionde la Rdpublique du Congo, Titre XVIII, art. 185(2) (2002): "Aucune procedure de
revision ne peut 8tre engagre ou poursuivie lorsqu'il est port6 atteinte Al'intagritO du territoire"; art.
185(3): "La forme rrpublicaine, le caract~re laic de l'ttat, le nombre de mandats du President de la
Rrpublique ainsi que lesdroits 6noncrs aux titres I et II ne peuvent faire l'objet de revision."
218. Ibid., arts. 178(4): "No procedure of amendment shall be engaged in or followed when it
attempts to touch the integrity of the territory."; 178(5): "The republican form, the secularity of the
State, and the number of mandates of the President of the Republic shall not be the object of any
amendment."; 178(6): "Amendment shall not have the object of the reduction or the abolition of
fundamental rights and liberties enunciated in Title H."; Title II, arts. 10- 11, 13, 18, 22, 26-27, 29, 3334, 37, 46, respectively.
219. Ibid., Title II, arts. 12, 16, 23, 31.
220. Constitutionof The Republic of Cameroon, being Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to amend
the Constitution of 2 June 1972, 1972, as amended by 1996, Part XI, art. 64 "No procedure for the
amendment of the Constitution affecting the republican form, unity and territorial integrity of the State
and the democratic principles which govern the Republic shall be accepted."
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from amendment.22' In Mali, neither territorial borders, republicanism,
secularism, nor political pluralism is subject to amendment.2 22 Mauritania
does something similar, removing territorial integrity, republicanism
and pluralist democracy from amendability. 22 Niger also falls under this
category insofar as it screens from revision or repeal the following: (1) the
territorial integrity of the nation; (2) republicanism; (3) political pluralism;
(4) secularism; (5) the rules governing presidential election; and (6)
constitutional amnesty afforded to those responsible for two designated
224
coups d'6tat.
b. Superstatutes
In an influential article, Eskridge and Ferejohn illuminate the concept
of a superstatute. 225 A superstatute is a statute that has achieved quasiconstitutional status because: (1) it is important in some salient respect;
and (2) it becomes synonymous in the public imagination with the
privileges or duties of citizenship. Although in theory a superstatute
remains a conventional statute-meaning that it remains subject to repeal
by the.legislature through the normal course of the legislative process-it

22 1. Constitution of the Republic of Gabon, 199 1, Law No. 3/91, Title XI1, art. 117.
222. Constitutionof the ThirdRepublic of Mali, 1992, Titre XVI, art. 118.
223. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 1991, as amended to 2006: "No
procedure for the amendment of the Constitution may be initiated if it calls into question the existence
of the State or infringes the integrity of the territory, the republican form of the institutions, or the
pluralist character of Mauritanian democracy."
224. Constitution ofNiger of July 18, 1999, Title XII, art. 136.
225. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, "Super-Statutes" (2001) 50 Duke L.J. 1215.
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is unlikely to be repealed precisely because of the distinctive position it
226
occupies in the constitutional architecture of a given state.
Eskridge and Ferejohn enumerate three characteristics that define
superstatutes: (1) they endeavour to establish a new framework for
public policy; (2) they develop, over time, some resonance in the public
227
consciousness; and (3) they have a corresponding effect on the law.
Three paradigmatic examples of superstatutes are the Sherman Act, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.228 Some
have argued that other American statutes may have achieved the status of
superstatute, including the Medicare Act, 229 the Voting Rights Act, 23 ° the
232
AdministrativeProcedureAct,23 ' the NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct,
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,233 the Religious Freedom Restoration

226. The term superstatute is often used to describe a constitution. See e.g. Bryan P. Wilson, "State
Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky Falling?" (2004) 53
Emory L.J. 627 at 637; Gordon S. Wood, "The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the
Marshall Court Made More out of Less" (1999) 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787 at 801; Catherine Kemp,
"Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the Common Law" (1999) 76 Denv. U.L.
Rev. 961 at 970; Martha M. Ertman, "Sexuality: Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not
Heaven, but Not Hell Either" (1996)73 Deny. U.L. Rev. 1107 at 1112, n. 13; Christopher L. Eisgruber,
"The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution" (1995) 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 47 at 59; John V. Orth, "North
Carolina Constitutional History" (1992) 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1759 at 1783; Henry Paul Monaghan, "Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication" (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723 at 770, n. 266; Henry Paul
Monaghan, "Our Perfect Constitution" (1981) 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 353 at 392. This view conceives of
a constitution as simply a special statute that is subject to extraordinary rules for amendment. For our
purposes, I will set aside this formulation because it is unrelated to the theory of superstatutes that
forms the focus of these pages. The constitution-as-superstatute construction is moreover subject to the
criticism that it fails to recognize that a constitution is more than the list of principles that constitutes
and constrains the state. See e.g. Stephen M. Griffin, "The Problem of Constitutional Change" (1996)
70 Tul. L. Rev. 2121 at 2148; Thomas B. McAffee, "The Augustan Constitution and our Natural
Rights Tradition: Is There a Conflict?" (1995) 4 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 693 at 695; John E.
Simonett, "An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution" (1994) 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
227 at 229.
227. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1890). Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 225 at 1216.
228. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544 (1973); see also ibid. at 1231-46.
229. 42 U.S.C. §21 (1964). Jacqueline Fox, "Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal
Impediments to a Sound Policy" (2005) 53 Buff. L. Rev. 577 at 628-29.
230. 42 U.S.C. §1971 (1965); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., "Some Effects of Identity-Based
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Act,23 4 the Uniform Code of Military Justice,235 the

ControlledSubstances

Act, 2 6 and the FederalJudiciaryAct.237
We can trace the notion of a superstatute through several iterations,
beginning perhaps as early as 1368 under the reign of Edward III, through
the fundamental law for West New Jersey in 1676,238 to the modem theory
of statutory constitutionalism. 2 39 What brings unity to the concept of a
superstatute across the ages is that superstatutes create a new statutory
setting that constrains government action. 240 Superstatutes may also form
the basis or justification for further legislation. 241 Superstatutes announce
or proclaim a fundamental political principle that makes them seem more

like constitutions than like statutes. 242 They are consequently treated like
constitutional provisions. 243 Courts may freely interpret superstatutes just
as they would conventional statutes, that is by reading them either broadly
or narrowly and by either upholding or invalidating them. 244 In practice,
courts deem superstatutes as controlling legislation to which conventional
245
statutes must conform.
Some superstatutes may be repealed only by popular vote. 246 Certain
American states regard statutes created through the initiative process as
superstatutes that are amendable only by a subsequent initiative. 247 Some
234. 42 U.S.C. §200066 (1993); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, "A Funny Thing Happened on
the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on 'Equal Access' for Religious
Speakers and Groups" (1996) 29 U.C. Davis.L. Rev. 653 at 666, n. 31.
235. U.S.C. §801 (1950); see also Jon D. Michaels, "Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,
Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War" (2004) 82 Wash. U.L.Q. 1001 at 1087.
236. 21 U.S.C. §801 (1978); see also William N. Eskridge Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, "Chevron and
Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship" (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 2623 at 2624.
237. C. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Michael D. Shumsky, "Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule
of Law" (2004) 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 227 at 273, n. 215.
238. A.E. Dick Howard,"The Bridge at Jamestown: The Virginia Charter of 1606 and Constitutionalism
in the Modem World" (2007) 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 9 at 28-29.
239. See e.g. Peter M. Shane, "Voting Rights and the Statutory Constitution" (1993) 56 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 243 at 252-69.
240. Matthew S. R. Palmer, "Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete Constitution:
Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution" (2006) 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 587 at 588.
241. Michael J. Gerhardt, "Super Precedent" (2006) 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204 at 1214.
242. William D. Popkin, "Interpreting Conflicting Provisions of the Nevada State Constitution"
(2004) 5 Nev. L.J. 308 at 310.
243. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "'Is There a Text in this Class?' The Conflict Between
Textualism and Antitrust" (2005) 14 J. Contenip. Legal Issues 619 at 622.
244. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, "The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State" (2006) 75 Fordham L. Rev. 489 at 498.
245. Amanda L. Tyler, "Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons" (2005) 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1389 at
1438.
246. See J. Michael Allen III & Jamison W. Hinds, "Alabama Constitutional Reform" (2001) 53 Ala.
L. Rev. I at 2 1.
247. Cody Hoesly, "Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon" (2005) 93 Cal. L. Rev.
1191 at 1242.
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have deployed the theory of superstatutes in very interesting ways. For
instance, one scholar has argued that certain treaties should be regarded
as superstatutes. 248 Another has analogized superstatutes to quasi-global
social norms.24 9 Yet another has explored the implications of superstatute
theory in the context of unwritten constitutions.
Ackerman calls superstatutes amendment-analogues,suggesting that
they have had the effect of amending the constitution though they have
not in fact amended it.251' He furthermore distinguishes superstatutes from
transformative constitutional amendments on the basis that the former
are narrow albeit important commands and the latter reshape an area of
constitutional law in substantial ways. 2 Ackerman has recently explained
that he regards his constitutional moments project as complementary to,
and not in tension with, the theory of superstatutes, noting that his project
is concerned with statutes that warrant full constitutional status whereas
253
superstatutes are only quasi-constitutional.
c. Constitutionalismand constitutionalpossibilities
Having introduced both unamendability clauses and superstatutes,
let me turn to assessing them against the backdrop of the promise of
constitutionalism. I will argue that the former are inconsistent, while the
latter are consistent, with democratic constitutionalism. I begin first with
unamendability clauses.
My discomfort with unam.endability derives from the theory of
participatory democracy. Unamendability clauses undermine the prospect
of instilling in citizens a sense of investment in and ownership of their
state. Unamendability clauses are objectionable as a matter of. theory
because they chill constitutional discourse and prevent reconsideration
of the constitutional text, the very document that is the embodiment of
a people's nationhood and their vision for themselves and their state. In
contrast, superstatutes, insofar as they are just statutes that are subject to

248. See John C. Yoo, "Rejoinder: Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation" (2002) 90
Cal. L. Rev. 1305 at 1314.
249. See Rex D. Glensy, "Quasi-Global Social Norms" (2005) 38 Conn. L. Rev. 79 at 101.
250. David Jenkins, "From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law
Constitution" (2003) 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 863 at 940-45.
251. Rivka Weill, "Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism" (2006) 54 Am. J. Comp.
L. 429 at 459 n. 107.
252. See Bruce Ackerman, "Taxation and the Constitution" (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. I at 39; Bruce
Ackerman, "Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law" (1989) 99 Yale L.J. 453 at 521-22; see
also Steven D. Smith, "Reductionism in Legal Thought" (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 68 at 75, n. 32
("Ackerman contrasts 'transformative' amendments with others, which he calls 'superstatutes,' that
'do not seek to revise any of the deeper principles organizing our higher law,").
253. Bruce Ackerman, "The Living Constitution" (2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 at 1753, n. 38.
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repeal, reflect the fluidity that participatory democracy invites. Of these
two, only unamendability clauses are supraconstitutional because only
they limit the universe of constitutional possibilities that are open to the
people.
Before proceeding, let me raise an aside. One scholar refers to
unamendability clauses as a superconstitutional feature. 2 4 1 disagree with
this construction. I believe they are an example of supraconstitutionalism.
On my reading, super as a prefix suggests an excess or superiority with
respect to size, degree or intensity. In words that include the prefix super,
the term super qualifies the concept that follows it. For example, the term
supersonic refers to a speed that surpasses the speed of sound. Here, super
is used to indicate superiority in the intensity of speed. Likewise, the term
supercomputer refers a computer that is the mainframe of a network of
computers and, as the mainframe, is larger and more powerful than other
computers in the network. Here, super is deployed to suggest superiority
with respect to size. One final example is the term superfluous, in which the
prefix super points to an excess or extra flow or an overabundance of flow.
Thus, to identify something as superconstitutional would be to suggest
that a certain constitution or constitutional provision is superior in size or
degree or intensity to another constitution or constitutional provision.
In our particular context of unamendability clauses, to identify
unamendability as superconstitutional would be to suggest that
unamendability clauses in constitutions are superior in size, degree or
intensity to other constitutional provisions. Yet that is precisely where
I depart from those who would call unamendability clauses superconstitutional provisions. Unamendability clauses are not constitutional
provisions. Yes, technically, unamendability clauses are indeed located
within the constitutional texts. But conceptually, they effectively detach
themselves from the constitution.
The prefix supra refers something that stands above, over, or beyond the
term it qualifies. Thus, a supranational organization like the United Nations
is above or beyond the nation-state. The United Nations as an institution
is of course conceptually related to a nation-state but a schematic diagram
portraying the relationship between the two would display the United
Nations above the nation-state. In the same way, unamendability clauses
are supraconstitutional provisions: they are located above or outside the
constitutional text because they are not subject to the same rules, they
are invulnerable to revision or repeal, and they are beyond the control of
254. See Georg Ress, "Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty of October 12, 1993" (1994) 88
AJ.I.L. 539 at 546.
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constitutional amendment procedures within that text. That is why I call
unamendability clauses supraconstitutional, not superconstitutional.
The theory of unamendability derives from the conviction of
constitutional designers that certain principles or structures are so
profoundly pivotal to the meaning of constitutionalism as to warrant
enshrining a constitutional prohibition against their revision or repeal.255
This is a compelling theory, one that has persuaded leading constitutional
thinkers to endorse unamendability in some form. For instance, Cass
Sunstein has advised emerging democracies to make certain constitutional
rights unamendable 5 6 Bruce Ackerman has also suggested that the United
States should entrench unamendable rights,25 7 even as some have queried
wfiether the United States could constiftutionally add an unamendable
amendment to its present Constitution. 258 Another has argued that human
2 59
rights considerations might require an unamendable constitution.
I disagree. The strongest criticism of unamendability is that it privileges
substantive norms over popular sovereignty. 260 As some have suggested,
unamendability runs counter to fundamental principles of democracy. 26'
26 2
Others have argued that unamendability is in fact unconstitutional.
Another has observed that such unamendability clauses are essentially,
and merely, symbolic. 263 Each of these is partly correct but they do not
fully explain why unamendability is inconsistent with the promise of
constitutionalism.
The doctrine of unamendability does not actually contemplate that a
state may adopt a written constitution that forecloses any organ of the state
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"Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View" (1997) 46
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263. Jon Elster, "Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction" (1991) 58 U. Chicago L. Rev.
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from undoing what the constitution provides, as one scholar suggests. 264
Nor does the theory of unamendability provide only that unamendability
26
clauses cannot be set aside by the legislature, as another scholar posits.
Rather, on my construction, unamendability constrains more than simply
the state or an organ of the state such as the legislature. Unamendability
constrains the people. It does this in a manner that is qualitatively different
from countermajoritarian institutions like judicial review. Although
judicial review does indeed constrain popular majoritarian decisionmaking, the people nonetheless retain access to amendment mechanisms
that authorize them, at least theoretically, to adjust judicial decisions. The
people may also inform, either directly or indirectly, the judicial selection
and appointment mechanisms.
But unamendability conveys a different message to the people. It is
counterconstitutional because it conveys a debilitating and enfeebling
message to citizens. It tells them that they no longer have the capacity
to chart their own course, to define themselves through the practice of
constitutionalism and constitutional adjudication. Unamendability tells
citizens that, under no circumstances and irrespective of the intensity of
public opinion, certain constitutional provisions are unchangeable, not
only today but for all times. That is a disempowing thought that expresses
the very contrary vision of participatory democracy.
Unamendability compromises popular sovereignty by also creating
a cross-temporal binding effect that authorizes one particular people to
constrain a future people.266 Specifically, the ability of a people at Time 1 to
bind a different people at Time 2 raises a much more complex problem than
simply treading upon popular sovereignty. It is a question about whether
we may today be bound by yesterday's majorities, or likewise whether our
present majorities may bind future peoples. 267 Walter Dellinger captures
the point powerfully, stating that "an unamendable constitution, adopted
by a generation long since dead, could hardly be viewed as a manifestation
26
of the consent of the governed. 1

264. Kent Greenawalt, "Separation and Schools" (2000) 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1285 at 1286.
265. See Miriam Aziz, "Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained?" (2002) 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 109 at
122.
266. Michael J. Klarman, "Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem" (1997) 85
Geo. L.J. 491 at 508-09.
267. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, "Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation" (2002) 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 2085 at 2115.
268. Walter Dellinger, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment
Process" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 at 387.
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The result is to freeze history, which, incidentally, is what Kommers
argues was the intention of the German constitutional framers.2 69 This
exacts a terrible price upon civil society, for, as Hutchinson cautions, a
democratic state should not freeze its own structures because that is
merely a form of institutionalized control,2 70 which is the very antithesis
of participatory democracy. As a result, when constitutional texts entrench
unamendable clauses, they do so on the basis of a constitutional authority
that presumably resides not in the people but elsewhere. 271 Yet there can
be no other superseding source of legitimacy than the people themselves.
Any other source is only second-best in the context of participatory
democracy.
Unamendability therefore prevents constitutional change within the
confines of the existing constitutional regime. It does so in the interest
of the prevailing constitutional architecture that enshrined the given
unamendability clause. Whereas participatory democracy would permit
popular majorities that possess the requisite force and legitimacy to shape
the constitution as it wishes, 27 2 unamendability forces the constitutional
discussion outside of the constitution and into extraconstitutionality.
This paves the way to unconstitutional revolutionary change.2 73 Granted,
revolution is not necessarily a normatively bad result but it does create
instability, which is itself neither a constructive nor an appealing state of
constitutional affairs.
Let us now turn to superstatutes, which, in my view, enhance
democratic constitutionalism. Before arguing in favour of superstatutes,
let me first outline the quite powerful argument that superstatutes are
indeed supraconstitutional, much like unamendability clauses.
The claim against superstatutes is that they undermine participatory
democracy by restricting the universe of constitutional possibilities-and
they do so in a way that is similar to the way in which unamendability clauses
also limit these possibilities. As quasi-constitutional statutes, superstatutes
find themselves located in the constitutional equivalent of purgatory.
They are not mere statutes yet they are also not quite constitutional. This
269. Donald P. Kommers, "The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment" (2000) 53 SMU L. Rev. 477 at
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creates ambiguity precisely where clarity is needed. Superstatutes become
constitutionally and politically virtually unrepealable despite being nothing
more than simple statutes. This leads to uncertainty insofar as it is unclear
how citizens are to express their wish to replace superstatutes or to remove
them entirely from their privileged quasi-constitutional status because
courts and legislatures come to regard these superstatutes as imbued with
special meaning. But the result is that these statutes-they are, after all,
just statutes-become unrepealable, even though these superstatutes have
not in fact been officially entrenched in the constitution.
The argument against superstatutes might also note that superstatutes
are not only unrepealable but they may also be unamendable. According
27 4
to Eskridge, superstatutes are informal amendments to the constitution.
Superstatutes are therefore an effective substitute for constitutional
amendments, which have become virtually impossible to adopt in the
United States.2 75 In light of their status as informal amendments, courts
and legislatures treat superstatutes as special statutes that demand special
protections from repeal orrevision. Unless these superstatutes outline in their
text the acceptable ways to amend or revise them, superstatutes effectively
become unamendable, which makes superstatutes look and feel very
similar to unamendability clauses. As I have argued above, unamendability
clauses undermine the prospects for participatory democracy, and so do
superstatutes when assessed through this lens. This would be the claim
against superstatutes. It is strong. But it is insufficient to undermine the
redeeming popular and participatory virtues of superstatutes.
One can trace the virtue of a superstatute directly to its origins.
Specifically, whether a statute becomes a superstatute is not entirely up
to the legislature. It is not a congressional prerogative to convert a statute
into a supersiatute. It is instead a dialogic process that includes the people
and their government agents in the branches of government.2 76 This kind
of exchange between citizens and their representatives promotes salutary
and valuable benefits for citizenship and for integrating citizens into a
culture of civic engagement and participation. On this view, superstatutes
embody the very core of participatory democracy because they concretize
only when legislative choices converge in a potent way with popular
preferences.
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Superstatutes derive their legitimacy from the citizenry. They are
2 77
unusually broad statutes that emerge from the efforts of social movements,
27
to which courts and legislatures acquiesce or respond with approval. 1
The immediate result of superstatutes is to induce a constructive exchange
among citizens, the legislature and the judiciary about the range of the
rights, protections or terms articulated in the statutory text.279 The ultimate
result of superstatutes is to shape constitutional meaning 280 by influencing
281
the evolution of constitutional law.
When we weigh the merits and demerits of superstatutes, the balance
of popular authority tips in favour of viewing superstatutes favorably.
Superstatutes celebrate, and do not undermine, participatory democracy.
They encourage citizens to participate in drawing the boundary separating
themselves from their state. They invite broad mobilizations or social
movements to speak to important public matters of the day. Superstatutes
also conceive of constitutionalism as a vehicle through which citizens
may set the trajectory of the state. Perhaps most notably, the process by
which citizens and the state collaborate to create superstatutes reflects the
ultimate triumph of active citizenship. For these reasons, superstatutes are
not supraconstitutional. They are instead altogether consistent with the
promise of constitutionalism.
Conclusion
Let me restate the paradox of democratic constitutionalism. On the
one hand, the promise of constitutionalism is participatory democracy.
Yet, on the other, some democratic constitutions actually undermine this
promise by enshrining counterconstitutional constitutional provisions. I
have introduced and illustrated two forms of counterconstitutionalism: (1)
contraconstitutionalism, which I associate with aspirational bills of rights;
and (2) supraconstitutionalism, of which unamendability clauses are an
illuminating example. Both of these types of constitutional provisions run
counter to the project of creating and cultivating a constitutional culture
that is anchored in participatory democracy. Both run counter to the
promise of constitutionalism.
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Despite their counterconstitutional quality, aspirational bills of rights
and unamendability clauses both often embody laudable social objectives.
Indeed, they generally strive to express the very best of intentions for
designing a just, fair and prosperous state to which citizens can develop
a meaningful attachment and an abiding loyalty. Nevertheless, as they
are currently designed, aspirational bills of rights and unamendability
clauses fall short of achieving the participatory purposes of democratic
constitutionalism. This poses a pressing problem for the theory and
design of constitutions-a puzzle that constitutional theorists must solve
if constitutionalism is to fulfill its promise of creating and sustaining
participatory democracy.

